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A bstract
The dissertation explores mechanisms by which a lender can use 
timings of loans to engender peer monitoring and increase lending effi­
ciency, when lending to a group of jointly liable impoverished individ­
uals. We show that by disbursing the loans in a sequence (restricting 
the number of loans per period), the lender can finance a greater range 
of projects and allow poorer individuals to join the groups.
Sequential lending entails lending to one borrower per period with 
the proviso that the second borrower’s loan is contingent on first bor­
rower’s repayment. Simultaneous lending lets the borrowers make the 
decisions on their respective tasks simultaneously, requiring the lender 
to incentivise tasks collectively. Sequential lending separates the de­
cisions on the task temporally and tasks are incentivised individually. 
Conversely, the lender’s capital is less productive in sequential as com­
pared to simultaneous lending. We show that if monitoring technology 
is sufficiently efficient, a greater range of projects are feasible under 
sequential lending.
In a case-study of a Microfinance Institution in India, we found evi­
dence of sequential lending. The lender restricted the number of group 
members that could borrow simultaneously, giving non-borrowers in­
centives to monitor the borrowers. We found significant income het­
erogeneity within the groups with wealthier members obtaining a 
higher proportion of loans.
We build a stylised model based on the case-study. We show 
that the lender can engender negative assortative matching (wealthy 
pairing-up with poorer individuals) by restricting credit to the group. 
By requiring that the borrower and the non-borrower acquire a stake 
in the borrower’s project, the lender determines the wealth-threshold 
for joining the group. Restricting credit creates intra-group competi-
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tion for loans. The wealthy pair-up with poorer individuals to curtail 
the competition for loans within the group. By forbidding the group 
members to borrow simultaneously, the lender is able to lower the 
wealth-threshold for joining the group.
4
To mamma and papa
5
Table of Contents
List of Figures 8
List of Tables 9
Acknowledgements 10
Introduction 11
Overview .....................................................................................................  11
Related Literature ..................................................................................... 17
1 Sequential Group Lending with Moral Hazard 20
1.1 In troduction ....................................................................................... 20
1.2 M o d e l ................................................................................................. 23
1.3 Individual L e n d in g .......................................................................... 25
1.4 Group L e n d in g ................................................................................  29
1.5 Group lending with varying efficiency of Monitoring Technology 41
1.6 Conclusion..........................................................................................  44
Appendix .............................................................................................  45
1.7 Individual L e n d in g ..............................................................................45
1.8 Group L e n d in g .....................................................................................47
1.9 Varying Efficiency of M onitoring....................................................... 54
6
2 The Casestudy 57
2.1 In troduction ...........................................................................................57
2.2 B ackground ........................................................................................... 58
2.3 The Fieldwork........................................................................................59
2.4 Solving the Information P ro b lem s......................................................65
2.5 C onclusions........................................................................................... 71
3 An Analysis of Saving Opportunities in Group Lending 72
3.1 In troduction ........................................................................................... 72
3.2 M o d e l .....................................................................................................75
3.3 Individual L e n d in g .............................................................................. 77
3.4 Group L e n d in g .....................................................................................81
3.5 Interest Rate Policy.............................................................................. 91
3.6 Conclusion.............................................................................................. 94
Appendix .................................................................................................96
3.7 Group Lending: Saver’s C o n tr a c t ...................................................... 96
3.8 Group Lending: Lender’s p rob lem .....................................................99
Conclusion 106
Bibliography 108
7
List of Figures
1.1 Monitoring Intensities in Group L e n d in g ....................................... 39
1.2 Effects of Varying the Efficiency of M onitoring..............................42
2.1 Flow of Funds in the Self Help Group Lending Mechanism . . 60
3.1 Borrower’s Wealth Threshold in Individual L e n d in g ....................80
3.2 Source and Cost of Capital in Group L e n d in g ..............................82
3.3 Borrower’s and Saver’s C o n s tra in ts ................................................. 86
3.4 Reaching the Poor with the Interest Rate P o lic y .......................... 94
8
List of Tables
2.1 Growth of Self Help Group Linkage Programme in India . . .  59
2.2 Number of Group Members with Outstanding Loans ................ 69
2.3 No. of Non-borrowing Members in the G r o u p ..............................70
2.4 Income Heterogeneity in the G r o u p ................................................. 70
2.5 Borrowing by the Wealthy Group M em bers.................................... 71
9
Acknowledgem ents
I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Oriana Bandiera for her invaluable 
advise, consistent encouragement and patient support. I would also like to 
thank Prof. Jozsef Sakovics and Prof. Jonathan Thomas for their extensive 
comments on the early drafts of the thesis.
To my parents, who have kept me going through the ups and downs, I 
owe everything. My heartfelt gratitude to my friend Sherina for everything. 
Especially, for taking on the arduous task of proof reading the numerous 
half-baked early versions of the thesis. Any remaining typos are, of course, 
my responsibility.
10
Introduction
Overview
The objective of this dissertation is to explore the mechanisms by which 
a lender can engender peer monitoring when lending to a group of jointly 
liable impoverished individuals. We examine how disbursing the loans in 
sequence (or restricting the number of loans per period) to a group can help 
the lender save on the economic rents left to the borrowers given that saving 
on economic rents can potentially allow the lender to (a) finance a greater 
range of projects and (b) lower the wealth threshold required for participating 
in group lending.
The poor lack wealth which can be put up as collateral for a loan. Thus, 
from the lender’s perspective, lending to the poor individuals for investment 
projects is expensive in terms of rents. Their limited ability to bear liability 
in case of an unsuccessful outcome restricts the lender’s ability to incentivise 
their effort by punishing failure. Thus, the lender has to incentivise individual 
borrower’s effort through rents. The lender is unable to finance some less 
productive yet socially viable projects because of these rents.
The group lending literature suggests that this problem can be partially 
alleviated if the loans are disbursed to groups of individuals who can be held 
jointly liable for each other’s outcome. An individual borrower’s incentive for
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effort is sharper when she is part of a jointly liable group. W ith joint liability, 
the lender can punish a borrower for her peer’s failure, which may induce 
cooperation and lead to information sharing amongst the group members.
Put simply, with joint liability, it is cheaper, in terms of the rents, to 
satisfy a group’s collective incentive compatibility constraint1 than it is to 
satisfy an individual’s incentive compatibility constraint.2 Of course, this 
only holds when the borrowers in a group can influence each other’s action.
In these essays, we assume that the agents can influence each other’s ef­
fort choice by monitoring each other. There are private benefits associated 
with insufficient (low) effort which a peer can curtail by monitoring.3 Conse­
quently, the lender can influence the borrower’s effort choice either directly 
through the rents he offers her or indirectly by engendering peer monitoring.
If it is costly for the group members to influence each other’s effort 
through monitoring, the borrowers will also have to be compensated for the 
cost incurred while monitoring. The lender has to ensure that each bor­
rower’s two tasks, monitoring and effort, are incentivised and the group’s 
collective incentive compatibility condition is satisfied.
The group’s collective incentive compatibility condition is also the con­
dition that ensures that the group does not collude. On one hand, this 
condition encourages the group to take all decisions cooperatively. On the 
other hand, it ensures that the group does not benefit additionally from col­
luding. The rents that satisfy the group’s collective incentive compatibility 
condition can be called the collusion rents.
In the first essay we show that in terms of rents, satisfying the group’s col­
1This is the incentive compatibility condition of the group where the group is presumed 
to be a single entity. Alternatively, it is a group that can perfectly collude.
2This is, if the joint liability payments are high enough.
3 Specifying monitoring in this way is the reduced form of a much richer interaction 
between the agents.
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lective incentive compatibility condition is more expensive than incentivising 
the borrowers to undertake the two tasks (monitoring each other and exerting 
sufficient effort on their project respective projects). That is, the collusion 
rents are higher than the rents that incentivise the two tasks.
If lender disburses the loans simultaneously to the group, the borrowers 
make their respective decisions on monitoring and effort simultaneously. It is 
the simultaneity of the decisions on the two tasks that requires the lender to 
compensate the group collectively. In effect, the group can obtain collusion 
rents even if it does not possess the ability to collude or possess limited ability 
to collude. Conversely, if the decisions are temporally separated, the group 
would no longer be able to retain collusion rents and the lender would have 
to just incentivise the two tasks.
We show that the lender can lower the rents the borrowers retain by 
lending sequentially to the group. Lending sequentially to a group of two 
would entail lending initially to a randomly chosen group member i. j , the 
remaining member of the group, gets the loan only if € s project succeeds. 
With this mechanism, the lender would only have to incentivise the two 
tasks individually and the group’s collective incentive compatibility condition 
would remain slack.
In terms of the lender’s ability to finance low productivity projects, the 
picture is mixed. The disadvantage of sequential group lending is that it 
punishes the whole group for i ’s (first borrower’s) project failure. This low­
ers the productivity of the lender’s capital. We show that if the monitoring 
technology is sufficiently efficient, a greater range of low productivity projects 
are feasible under the sequential as compared to simultaneous group lending 
mechanism. The rents that lender saves by employing the sequential mecha­
nism decreases as the monitoring technology becomes more inefficient. Con­
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sequently, if the monitoring technology is sufficiently inefficient, a greater 
range of low productivity projects are feasible under the simultaneous as 
compared to the sequential mechanism.
In sequential lending mechanism, the lender is able to exploit the bor­
rower’s inability of side contract across time period to lower rents allocated 
to them. If the borrowers possessed unlimited ability to collude, the rents 
allocated to the borrower would be identical under simultaneous and sequen­
tial lending mechanisms. Sequential lending mechanism only works if the 
borrowers in the group are not able to side contract over action across time. 
This could be the reason why, in practice, members are barred from grouping 
with their relatives by the lender.
The second essay is a case study of a Microfinance Institution (Mfl) work­
ing in Haryana in India. We examine the group lending mechanism used by 
this particular Mfl and analyse how the mechanism solves the information 
problems associated with lending to the poor. The Mfl allows 15 to 20 
members in each group. 54 group members from 5 different groups were 
interviewed for this case study. The study found that
(a) the group members made a fixed contribution each month to the group’s 
saving pot,
(b) the group members could borrow internally (from the group’s saving 
pot) as well as externally (from an external credit source)4,
(c) the lender induced sequential lending in the group by restricting the 
number of members in a group that could borrow simultaneously at a 
given point in time,
4The Mfl arranges the external loans for the group. Under the rules of the Self Help 
Group Linkage Programme, India’s national microfinance programme, the Mfl is not al­
lowed to lend directly to the groups or act as a financial institution.
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(d) the group had significant income heterogeneity within it and the wealth­
ier members of the group obtained a high proportion of the loans5 given 
to the group and
(e) about half the members of each group had chosen not to borrow even 
though other members had borrowed more than once.
The case study thus finds evidence of the Mfl in India lending sequen­
tially within the groups. Further, the case study suggests that, by restricting 
simultaneous lending in this particular mechanism, the lender is able to en­
gender peer monitoring by partitioning the group between borrowers and 
non-borrowers using their wealth. The non-borrowers are given explicit in­
centives to monitor the borrower. This is done by allowing internal lending 
within the group, which effectively makes the non-borrower an equity investor 
in the borrower’s project.
In the third essay, we build a stylised model based on this case study. 
We assume that the borrowers have varying amounts of cash wealth at their 
disposal. A group is endogenously formed for only one period and consists of 
two borrowers. The lender offers the group a contract where only one mem­
ber from the group can borrow. The group contract specifies the amounts 
the borrower and the non-borrower have to invest in the borrower’s project 
and their respective payoffs. The lender lends the remaining capital for the 
borrower’s project to the group. The group contract in effect specifies the 
wealth thresholds for becoming a borrower or a non-borrower in the group.
The optimal contract is characterised by the non-borrower’s return on 
her equity investment. The lender is able to engender optimal amount of 
monitoring by ensuring that the non-borrower’s return compensates her for 
the opportunity cost of capital and the costs incurred whilst monitoring.
5 in terms of value
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Restricting the credit creates intra-group competition for the loans in 
the group. The essay shows that by restricting the credit, the lender can 
engender negative assortative matching, i. e. the relatively wealthy agents6 
pairing up with poorer agents7 to form groups. For the relatively wealthy, 
grouping with a poor agent eliminates the intra-competition for loans.
This group lending mechanism gives the poor an opportunity to enrich 
themselves by allowing them to earn a higher than market return on their 
cash wealth. Thus, prohibiting the group members from borrowing simulta­
neously enables the lender to lower the wealth threshold of participating in 
the group.
The essay further shows that as the opportunity cost of capital in the 
economy decreases, the wealth threshold for the non-borrower increases while 
the gap in the borrower’s and non-borrower’s wealth threshold closes. We 
define the optimal cost of capital, in this context, as the one which allows 
the poorest borrower to join the group as a non-borrower and graduate on 
to becoming a borrower in one loan cycle.
From the perspective of the government thus, subsiding the cost of capital 
is only warranted if the market cost of capital is higher than the optimal cost 
of capital. If the market cost of capital is lower, then subsidising the cost of 
capital harms the interests of the poor.
The following section discusses the related literature in group lending.
6Relatively wealthy agents are the ones that have wealth greater than the borrower’s 
wealth threshold.
7Poorer agents are the ones that have wealth that lies between the borrower’s and 
non-borrower’s wealth thresholds.
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Related Literature
A recurrent theme in the moral hazard literature on group lending has been 
that joint liability induces the borrowers in a group to effectively collude,
i.e. behave cooperatively. Consequently, if the group’s collective incentive 
compatibility condition is satisfied, the borrowers choose effort cooperatively, 
which is beneficial to the lender, who, in turn, passes it on to the borrowers. 
(Stiglitz (1990), Varian (1990) and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999)). Thus, 
any gains in lending efficiency, i.e. lowering of the borrower’s rents, can 
potentially benefit the borrower’s themselves.
With joint liability, the risk each group member faces on her own in 
group lending is higher than in individual lending. Stiglitz (1990) shows 
that joint liability induces members to monitor each other in the group. 
The overall risk reduction of the group due to peer monitoring outweighs 
the increased individual risk imposed by joint liability leading to increased 
lending efficiency.
Stiglitz (1990) assumes that the borrowers are able to observe each other’s 
actions and collude on actions without incurring any costs. Ghatak and 
Guinnane (1999) show that if social sanctions are sufficiently effective or peer 
monitoring is sufficiently inexpensive, the group members can collude, i, e. 
contract on effort amongst themselves leading to increased lending efficiency.
Laffont and Rey (2003) argue that “lending efficiency is enhanced when 
entrepreneurs mutually observe their efforts but reduced when they collude.” 
Their nuanced argument is that gains in the lending efficiency come from 
information sharing amongst the borrowers and not collusion per se. Thus, 
if observing and influencing effort choice within the group costs less than 
the rents that satisfy the group’s collective incentive compatibility condition, 
then the rents group members are obtaining are collusion rents.
17
Monitoring, by itself, is an unobservable task. When the groups are en­
couraged to collude, they internalise the cost of monitoring. (Stiglitz (1990), 
Varian (1990) and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999)) If the lender instead sets 
out to explicitly encourage the agents to monitor, he can only do so through 
rents. Consequently, in a standard delegated monitoring model with wealth 
less borrower and monitor, where the monitor can influence the borrower’s 
effort choice by monitoring, the lender incentivises effort and monitoring by 
allocating rents to the borrower and the monitor. Conning (1996) and Con­
ning (2000) show that in group lending, only the more expensive of the two 
rents have to be paid, leading to gains in lending efficiency.
Unfortunately, one of the rents turns out to be collusion rents. The group 
can only be induced to take on monitoring if the group’s collective incentive 
compatibility constraint is satisfied. Monitoring can only be induced if the 
borrowers are paid out the collusion rents. The intuition for this result 
is that in a group, the lender cannot incentivise two separate tasks with 
one instrument (in this case rent) without allowing the group to collude. 
The essays in this dissertation suggest that the lender can use time as an 
additional instrument. That is, the lender can use timing of the loans to 
incentivise the two tasks, without allowing the group to collude amongst 
themselves.
An alternative way to engender peer monitoring would be restrict the 
loans to only one member per group and allow the group members to bor­
row from each other. In a setup reminiscent of the delegated monitoring 
case, Banerjee et al. (1994) analyse the process by which peer monitoring is 
engendered in cooperatives, where the members are allowed to borrow both 
internally (from other group members) and externally. If a borrower’s project 
is partly financed by her peer, it gives the peer the incentive to monitor the
18
borrower. The peer monitors to safeguard the returns from her equity in­
vestment in the borrower’s project. In the third essay, we use this framework 
to analyse endogenous group formation and examine whether it allows the 
lender to lower the wealth threshold for joining a group.
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Chapter 1
Sequential Group Lending w ith  
Moral Hazard
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter we compare sequential and simultaneous group lending mech­
anisms. In simultaneous group lending, all the borrowers in the group receive 
their loans simultaneously. Conversely, in sequential group lending, the loans 
are disbursed sequentially within the group with the proviso tha t the second 
borrower obtains the loan only if the first borrower’s project succeeds.
In simultaneous group lending, the borrowers make their decisions on 
their respective tasks simultaneously. Consequently, the lender has to in­
centivise their actions collective by satisfying the group’s collective incentive 
compatibility condition. Lending sequentially allows the lender to tempo­
rally separate the borrower’s decision on their respective tasks. As a result, 
the lender incentivises’ the borrower’s tasks individually and not collectively, 
leaving the group’s collective incentive compatibility condition slack. Con­
sequently, the lender is able to lower the rents allocated to the borrowers by
20
lending sequentially.
The disadvantage of lending sequentially is that punishing the whole 
group for the first borrower’s project failure lowers the productivity of lender’s 
capital. Consequently, we show that for a sufficiently efficient monitoring 
technology, the lender is able to finance a greater range of projects with 
sequential as compared to simultaneous group lending.
In practice, Grameen Bank (Bangladesh) follows the sequential group 
lending model where borrowers receive their credit sequentially. Banco Sol- 
idario (Bolivia) and ACCION affiliated microfinance organisations allocate 
credit within the groups simultaneously
Varian (1990) explores the benefits of sequential lending in a setup with 
heterogeneous borrowers, i.e. ones with high and low productivity. The 
critical assumption in the paper is that, given requisite incentives, the high 
productivity borrower can school the low productivity borrower and turn  her 
into a high productivity borrower.
The paper shows that when lending to a group of randomly selected 
borrowers, the lender prefers to lend sequentially, as it increases his profits. 
He offers the second period borrower a contract only after observing the 
output of the first period borrower. If the first period borrower is the low 
type, schooling her helps the second borrower get a favourable contract.
Lending sequentially increases the lender’s profit in two ways. First, the 
first period production signal helps him in sorting out the borrower’s type 
more effectively. Second, the information transmission increases the number 
of high productivity borrowers. The result of the paper, of course, rests on 
the assumption of perfect information transmission within groups.
In a recent contribution, Roy Chowdhury (2005) finds that in a costly 
monitoring setup, group lending with joint liability does not necessarily al­
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leviate the moral hazard problem.
There is strategic complementarity between the monitoring levels of the 
two borrowers in the group, i.e. monitoring by one borrower encourages 
the other borrower to monitor and vice versa. Roy Chowdhury (2005) finds 
that this strategic complementarity leads to both borrowers choosing to not 
monitor when borrower obtain credit simultaneously. Lending sequentially 
enhances the incentives for peer monitoring and results in positive levels of 
monitoring.
The no-monitoring result in simultaneous group lending in Roy Chowd­
hury (2005) are driven by the assumption1 that the interest rate the lender 
charges the borrower is exogenously determined. Consequently, with insuffi­
cient rents, simultaneous group lending is infeasible. (Roy Chowdhury, 2005, 
Proposition 2, page 423) Of course, simultaneous group lending has shown 
to be viable in practice in Banco Solidario (Bolivia) and ACCION affiliated 
microfinance organizations among others. As discussed above, simultane­
ous group lending is feasible if the group can be encouraged to cooperate. 
This is achieved by satisfying the group’s collective incentive compatibility 
condition.
In this chapter we show that simultaneous group lending is feasible if the 
lender is free to vary the interest rate charged (and determine the borrower’s 
payoffs). If the borrowers can influence each other’s effort decision through 
monitoring, the lender will induce positive levels of monitoring in simulta­
neous group lending by allocating appropriate rents to the borrowers. This 
allows us to compare the cost (in terms of rents) of implementing the two 
lending mechanisms. We find that that the borrowers retain lower rents in 
sequential group lending.
1Roy Chowdhury (2005) follows Besley and Coate (1995) in assuming that the interest 
rate charged by the lender is exogenously given.
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1.2 M odel
There are two agents B \ and B 2 . Each of them has access to a project 
requiring a lump-sum investment of 1 unit of capital. The project produces 
an uncertain and observable outcome x , valued at x  when it succeeds (s) and 
0 when it fails (/) .
1.2.1 Agents
The agents are risk neutral, with zero reservation wage and no wealth. Agents 
may choose to pursue the aforementioned project with a high (H ) or low (L) 
effort e, which is unobservable. With a high (low) effort, x  is realised with a 
probability n h (nl) and 0 with 1 — irh (1 — n l). (7rh > 7t1)
By exerting low effort, agents obtain private benefits of value B  from 
the project which is non-pecuniary and non-transferable amongst the agents. 
The private benefits can be curtailed by monitoring, which is undertaken at 
a non-pecuniary cost c to the agent monitoring.
The agents are able to monitor and curtail each other’s private benefits. 
The extent of monitoring is observable to the agents but unobservable to 
the lender. We impose the following assumption on the monitoring function 
B(c).
A ssum ption  1 (Monitoring function B(c)).
I  B{0) > 0
ii. B{c) is continuous and at least once differentiable Vc ^  0 
Hi B c(c) < 0  V c >  0
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1.2.2 The Lender
The lender is risk-neutral. He is not able to monitor the agents and can 
only punish them through their payoffs. The lender can costlessly observe 
the initial capital invested in the project and the output from the project. 
We assume that the lender has the ability to enforce the contracts once the 
project outcome is realised.
The lender has access to capital at p, the opportunity cost of capital. 
The lender faces competition and is unable to earn any rents on the funds 
he lends, thus making zero profit.
1.2.3 The A gent’s Payoff
In individual lending, the borrower borrows 1 unit of capital once she accepts 
the contract offered by the lender. The lender may choose to delegate the 
task of monitoring to another agent. The lender makes the borrower’s and 
the monitor’s payoff, bi and Wi respectively, contingent on i , the borrower’s 
project outcome.
In group lending, the lender finances the projects of the group members Bi 
and B 2 once they accept the group contract offered by the lender. We assume 
that both borrowers want to undertake identical projects and the lender 
offers them symmetrical contracts. The lender makes the borrower’s payoff 
bij contingent on i and j ,  the outcomes of B\ and B 2 s projects, respectively, 
in the group contract.
In a joint liability group contract a borrower’s payoff is affected by her 
peer’s project outcome. (biS ^  bif) The lender can punish a borrower for her 
peer’s project failure by ensuring that bis ^  bif for i = { s , f }  with at least 
one strict inequality.
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1.3 Individual Lending
In individual lending, the individual borrower undertakes a project by bor­
rowing 1 unit of capital from the lender if she accepts the contract (bs,b f ).
1.3.1 First-Best
The perfect information case, where the lender can observe the borrower’s 
effort level, is examined as a benchmark. The lender offers the borrower a 
contract (bs,b f ) tha t solves the following problem:
max E [x  \ H] -  E[bi \ H]bi
E [b i\H ]  ^  0 (1.1)
bi ^  0; i = s , f  (1.2)
The borrower’s participation constraint (1.1) binds and the limited liability 
constraint (1.2) binds in state / .  The lender offers the borrowers a contract 
where bs = bf = 0. If the borrower accepts the contract, she is able to 
undertake the project. Using the lender’s feasibility condition given below, 
we find tha t the lender can finance all the socially viable projects. —
7
E[x | H ]> E[bi | H] (1.3)
x s ^  -^r (\7T
1.3.2 Second-Best
W ith incomplete information, borrower’s effort is unobservable to the lender.
The lender needs to give the borrower incentive to exert high effort by re-
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warding her sufficiently if her project succeeds.
E[h  | H] >  E[bi | L] +  B(0) (1.4)
The incentive compatibility constraint above ensures that the borrower is not 
worse off by exerting high effort. With no, monitoring, the private benefits 
are at their maximal value, £(0).
The Optimal Contract without Delegated M onitoring
The lender offers the borrower a contract (bs,b f) that solves the following 
problem:
subject to the borrower’s participation constraint (1.1), limited liability con­
straint (1.2) and incentive compatibility constraint (1.4).
The contract ensures that the incentive compatibility constraint (1.4) binds 
and the limited liability constraint (1.2) binds only for state / .
The borrower is left with a positive expected rent leaving her participation 
constraint slack.
The lender is unable to punish the borrower when the projects fails be­
cause of the limited liability constraint. The borrower gets the requisite 
incentive for high effort through higher payoffs when the project succeeds. 
This allows the borrower to retain a strictly positive limited liability rent. 
(Laffont and Martimort, 2002, page 119) Using the lender’s feasibility con-
max E [ x  \ H] — E[bi \ H]
The lender offers the borrower a contract where A7T =  ir‘
E[bi \H] = irh ^ 5 1  >  o ^ (1.5)
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>6
straint (1.3) we get the set of feasible projects.
&7 rhP , B(0)U ' A ( 1.6)
L em m a 1. With imperfect information, the lender is unable to finance some 
socially viable projects.
D elegated  M onito ring
Group lending is plagued with the possibility of collusion between the borrow­
ers in the group. Understanding how collusion is prevented in the delegated 
monitoring model helps us better understand how it can be prevented in 
group lending.
Like the effort level, the lender cannot observe the task of monitoring. If 
the lender delegates the task of monitoring, he makes the m onitor’s payoff 
contingent on the borrower’s project outcome. This gives the monitor the 
requisite incentive to influence the borrower’s effort choice by monitoring her 
and curtailing her private benefits B. This particular lending mechanism is 
partially akin to  joint liability in group lending, where the two borrower’s 
project outcomes affect each other’s payoffs.
The borrower’s and monitor’s contracts work in conjunction with each 
other. The borrower’s contract aims to influence her effort choice directly 
through her payoff. The lender is also able to influence the borrower’s effort 
choice indirectly through the monitor’s contract.
The lender’s problem is solved in Appendix 1.7.1. We find th a t the bor­
rower’s and m onitor’s incentive compatibility constraints bind in the optimal 
contract. Their respective participation constraints remain slack and their
The lender is not able to finance projects x E ^ +
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limited liability constraints bind only in the state / .  The lender offers the 
borrower a contract anc  ^ ^he monitor a contract (^§-,0), where
Cdm =  minfB"1^ ) , ^ - ^ - ! ) ] .
Consequently, delegating the task of monitoring is feasible only if B c(0) < 
— 1. The condition ensures that the benefit of curtailing the borrower’s pri­
vate benefit initially is not overwhelmed by the payoff allocated to the mon­
itor. The lender induces monitoring till, either the marginal benefit from 
inducing additional monitoring at the margin is matched by the cost of in­
ducing it or the private benefits are driven down to zero. The borrower and 
the monitor retain the following expected rent respectively.
E[bi | H] = n hB ^ dm'>
Z\7r
E[Wi | H ] - c  = 7T1^
C ollusion
We examine whether the borrower and the monitor benefit from colluding, 
if they could fully side-contract amongst themselves. Collusion would entail 
the borrower exerting low effort and the monitor not monitoring.
P ro p o sitio n  1. I f  the borrower’s private benefits are non-pecuniary and non- 
transferable, the borrower and the monitor would not collude, even if  they 
could fully side contract amongst themselves.
Let’s assume tha t agents can fully side-contract amongst themselves cost­
lessly. Agents would choose monitoring intensity and effort level together 
in order to maximise their collective payoffs. Thus, the no-collusion con­
dition for the borrowers given below compares the expected surplus from
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not-colluding with the expected surplus from colluding.
E[bi | H\ +  E[wi | H \ - c >  E[bi | L\ +  E[Wi \ L]
Using the monitor’s and the borrower’s contracts from section 1.3.2, we 
find that the no-collusion condition is always satisfied given that ^  0-
By not monitoring, the monitor lowers her expected surplus by a greater 
amount than the amount she saves in cost of monitoring. Consequently, the 
borrower and the monitor do not benefit from colluding. Conversely, if the 
private benefits were transferable, the borrower and the monitor would prefer 
to collude. In this case, the no-collusion condition is given by
E[bi | H] +  E[wi | H \ - c >  E[bi | L] +  E[wi \ L] +  £(0)
Using the contracts from section 1.3.2, we find that the no-collusion con­
dition is never satisfied given that B(c) < B ( 0).
1.4 Group Lending
Limited liability restricts the lender’s ability to use the payoffs to punish a 
borrower when her project fails. Conversely, joint-liability allows the lender 
the use of payoffs to punish a successful borrower if her peer’s project fails. 
Consequently, a lender can use a joint-liability group-contract to give each 
borrower an explicit incentive to influence her peer’s effort decision by mon­
itoring her and thus reducing the likelihood of the peer’s project failing.
A groups consists of two borrowers, B\ and B 2 , seeking loans from the 
lender that would enable them to undertake their respective projects. We 
compare a group lending mechanism where borrowers borrow simultaneously
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with the one where they borrow sequentially.
1.4.1 Sim ultaneous Group Lending
The lender offers the borrowers a joint liability group contract. If they ac­
cept the contract, the borrowers obtain loans for their respective projects 
simultaneously.
With costless monitoring, the lender has to leave each borrower a smaller 
rent in group lending as compared to individual lending. That is because the 
group’s collective incentive compatibility condition gets satisfied with lower 
rents as compared to an individual’s incentive compatibility condition in this 
case. (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005, page 97)
We show below that with costly monitoring, the lender has to leave suf­
ficient rents to satisfy both
(1) the individual borrower’s incentive compatibility condition associated 
with effort when her peer exerts high effort and both borrower’s monitor 
each other
(2) the group’s collective incentive compatibility condition.
With costly monitoring, satisfying (2) requires simultaneously incentiviz- 
ing both the tasks, namely effort and monitoring. It should also be noted 
that in the case of costless monitoring, (1) is always satisfied if (2) is satisfied.
The lender can distinguish between the four states of the world, once the 
outcome of the projects are realised. These states {i j}  are: 
ss B \ and TVs projects succeed
s f  B i's  project succeeds and i?2’s project fails
f s  jBi’s project fails and jB2’s project succeeds
/ /  B\ and £ 2’s projects fail
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The game is played in two stages. The agents simultaneously choose 
their monitoring intensities and their effort choices in the first and second 
stage respectively. They choose a pair of monitoring intensities (ci, C2) in the 
first stage where Ck is the monitoring intensity chosen by Bk- A given pair 
of monitoring intensities (01, 02) then determines the payoff structure of the 
subgame £(01, 02) in effort decisions, in the second stage.
Let bij denote the borrower’s pecuniary payoff in state ij.  The timing of 
the game is as follows:
t= 0  The lender offers B\ and B 2 an identical contract (bss,bsf , b f s,bff).
I f  they accept the contract, the game continues. Otherwise, it termi­
nates.
t= l  B\ and B 2 choose their respective monitoring intensities C\ and C2 si­
multaneously.
t= 2  B\ and B 2 choose their respective effort levels e\ and e2 simultaneously.
t= 3  B\ and B f1 s project outcome is realised.
Both borrowers gets payoffs b^ depending on the state ij .
The limited liability constraint ensures that the borrower’s payoffs in the 
contract are non-negative.
bij ^  0 for i , j  = {s, /}  (1.7)
Symmetry requires that
bsf  = bfs (1-8)
A ssum ption  2 . The project returns are statistically independent.
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So, for instance, if Bi exerts high effort and B 2 exerts low effort, the 
likelihood of state s s  is 7rl7rh .
From the lender’s perspective, the desired outcome of the game is one 
where both borrowers choose to exert high effort on their respective projects. 
s s  and / /  are the two most informative states for the lender. If s s  occurs, 
the two agents are most likely to have undertaken requisite monitoring to 
induce high effort from their respective peer. If / /  occurs, the vice versa 
is true. Consequently, the lender should reward s s  and punish / /  to the 
maximum extent possible.
The limited liability constraint (1.7) binds for f f  leaving bff =  0. The 
lender can choose to allocate rewards among payoffs associated with rest of 
the states. Increasing bss sharpens the incentive for the borrowers to make 
the desired outcome more likely. Given that the borrowers are risk neutral, 
it is optimal for the lender to reward only s s  and leave no reward for any 
other states. Thus, the lender offers each agent a contract (bss, 0,0,0). ^  
We show in the Appendix 1.8.1 that if the following two conditions are 
met, the lender’s desired outcome is the pure strategy subgame perfect nash 
equilibrium (SPNE) of the game.
The first condition is H i’s (and symmetrically iV s) incentive compati­
bility constraint for effort level in the subgame £(c, c) where c ^  0.2
E{bij | H H ) -  c ^  E(bij | LH ) +  B{c)
Once the borrowers have decided on their monitoring intensities c, and B 2 
(Hi) has chosen to exert high effort, this condition ensures that B\ (B 2 ) is 
no worse off exerting high effort as compared to exerting low effort. This
2E(bij | LH)  =  TTl7rhbss is the expected payoff borrower B\  (and by symmetry B 2 ) gets 
when B i  (B 2 ) exerts low effort and B 2 (Hi) exerts high effort. See Assumption 2.
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condition is satisfied if
bss ^  —r r ~  (Condition 1)'Kh/\'K
Thus, monitoring makes inducing high effort cheaper for the lender. The 
second condition is the group’s collective incentive compatibility condition 
which ensures th a t the borrowers should not prefer the outcome where both 
borrowers do not monitor and exert low effort over the outcome where both 
monitor with intensity c > 0 and exert high effort.
E(bij | H H )  -  c ^ E(bij | LL) +  B {0) (1.9)
^ JT hats)is, by undertaking requisite monitoring and exerting high effort, the 
agents are no worse off than they would have been if they had not monitored 
at all and exerted low effort. This condition is satisfied if
bSs ^  \  (Condition 2)
7r h  —  it1
It should be noted, the payoff required to satisfy the condition 2 increases 
with c. Thus, the greater the monitoring intensity the lender wants to induce, 
the more expensive it is to satisfy the group’s collective incentive compatibil­
ity condition. We should also note tha t not allocating the borrowers sufficient 
rents to satisfy condition 2 is what made simultaneous group lending infea­
sible in Roy Chowdhury (2005, Proposition 2, page 423). W ith these two 
conditions satisfied, simultaneous group lending would always be feasible.
It is striking th a t the payoffs th a t satisfy Condition 2 depend on 5(0), 
the private benefits^withjrf w ithout^ionitoring and not on 5 (c ), the pri­
vate benefits after monitoring. Although, within a group, monitoring makes 
incentivizing the individual effort cheaper at the margin (Condition 1), it
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makes satisfying both tasks collectively more expensive (Condition 2).
We can summarise with the following proposition.
P ro p o sitio n  2 . Simultaneous group lending is feasible i f  the borrowers are 
allocated rents which satisfy condition 1 and 2.
The lender’s problem follovra:
max E  [x \ H] — E[bij \ H)bij
subject to bss ^  ^  max [ B( c) ,a[B(0) +  c)] (1-10)
where a  = - r r r -  To minimise the rents that the borrowers retain, the7T —| 7T ’
lender induces monitoring intensity cSim defined by
a (B (0 )+ c sim) (1.11)
The borrower’s expected payoff is given by
0/1
E{bij | H H ) =  ^ ( £ ( 0 )  +  csim)  (1.12)
The lender’s feasibility condition E[xi | HH] ^  p +  E[bi \ HH] gives us
the set of project that can be financed under simultaneous group lending.
^  . "b A B^Cgim)
7T Z\7r
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1.4.2 Sequential Group Lending
The lender allocates credit sequentially. Only one borrower gets the loan
from the lender in the first period. The remaining borrower in the group
gets the loan only if the first borrower succeeds.
The lender randomly chooses a borrower in the group to lend to first.
Lets call the first borrower B\. In sequential group lending, her peer B 2 can
only borrow if S i ’s project succeeds. As before, Bi gets punished for the
failure of her peer’s project. Additionally, with sequential group lending, B 2
is denied the opportunity to borrow if her peer’s project fails. The agents
share the burden of failure equally as their payoffs are symmetric and the
first period borrower is chosen randomly.
In sequential group lending, the borrowers alternate between the task
of pursuing their project and monitoring their peer. When S i undertakes
the project, she is monitored by B 2 . Subsequently, their roles are reversed
if S i ’s project succeeds. The lender can distinguish between the following
three states:
/  S i ’s projects fails
s f  S i ’s projects succeeds and B 2 S project fails
ss B i and S 2’ s project succeeds
The lender offers the borrowers a contract with outcome-contingent pay­
offs (bss, bsf, bf). If S i ’s project fails, both borrowers receive 6/  and the game 
terminates. Conversely, if her project succeeds, S 2 gets the loan. If S 25s 
project succeeds (fails), both agents get a symmetrical payoff of bss (bsf ) and 
the game terminates. The timing of the game is as follows:
t = 0  The lender offers S i and S 2 an identical contract (bss,bsf ,bf) .
I f  they accept the contract, the game continues. Otherwise, it termi­
nates.
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t= l  B 2 chooses C2, the intensity with which she monitors B\.
t= 2  B i chooses ei, the effort level for her project.
t= 3  B f s  project outcome is realised.
I f  B i ’s project fails, both agents get bf. The game terminates.
I f  B \ ;s project succeeds, the game continues.
t= 4  B\ chooses c\, the intensity with which she monitors B 2 .
t= 5  B 2 chooses e2, the effort level for her project.
t= 6  B f  s project outcome is realised.
I f  B 2 *s project fails, both agents get bsf. The game terminates.
I f  B 2 ’s  project succeeds, both agents get bss. The game terminates.
The limited liability constraint ensures that all payoffs are non-negative.
bij ^  0 V i J  
bf ^  0
Again, the lender’s desired outcome is one where both borrowers choose 
to exert high effort on their respective projects. In Appendix 2, we show 
that the desired outcome is the SPNE of the game if the following condition 
is met.
bss ^  A  max \B(c), cl (Condition 3)7rnAir
The condition states that the payoff should be high enough to induce the 
borrowers to monitor with intensity c and exert high effort on their projects. 
If condition 3 is satisfied, the game will have a SPNE where both borrowers 
will exert high effort for their respective projects.
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P ro p o sitio n  3. Sequential group lending is feasible i f  the borrowers are al­
located rents which satisfy condition 3.
In sequential group lending, the lender only needs to satisfy the individ­
ual’s incentive compatibility condition associated with monitoring and effort. 
Unlike simultaneous group lending, the lender does not have to satisfy the 
group’s collective incentive compatibility condition.
In simultaneous group lending, allowing the group to make the decisions 
on the tasks simultaneously meant that both tasks had to be incentivzed 
simultaneously. By separating the decision temporally, the lender only has 
to incentivise the tasks individually at each stage.
For instance, by monitoring at t = 1, B 2 reduces the likelihood of getting a 
payoff of bf = 0 if the game terminates prematurely. Similarly, by monitoring 
at t =  4, B\ reduces the likelihood of B 2 s project failing and her bearing the 
brunt of joint liability by receiving payoff bsf  =  0. Consequently, bss just has 
to compensates them both for resources expended in monitoring. Similarly, 
both borrowers would exert high effort if bss covered their opportunity cost 
of high effort.
In the following section, we show that incentivizing the task individually 
is cheaper in terms of rents than incentivizing both tasks simultaneously.
The lender’s problem follows:
max E  [x \ H] — E[bij \ H]bij
subject to Condition 3
To minimise the rents that the borrowers retain, the lender would like to
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induce monitoring intensity cseq defined by
B{cSeq) Cseq ( ^ '^ )
The borrower’s expected payoff is given by
.h
£ [6y | HH] =  ^ c seq. (1.14)
Punishing the group if the first borrower’s project fails is expensive for 
the lender. The lender expects to pay the group more per unit capital lent in 
sequential as opposed to simultaneous group lending.3 Consequently, from 
the lender’s perspective, his capital is less productive in sequential group 
lending. Using the lender break-even condition, we find the set of all projects 
feasible under sequential group lending.
^  ^  h 7l i h\ A B ( Cseq)7Tn ( l + 7 r n )L\7r
1.4.3 Comparing Economic Rents
From Figure 1.1 it is clear that for all monitoring functions with the property 
Bcc < 0 V c ^  0, we would have csirn < cseq and B(csim) > F?(cse9).4 The 
lender would induce more monitoring in sequential as opposed to simultane­
ous group lending if monitoring reduces the borrower’s private benefits.
In both simultaneous and sequential group lending, effort gets incentivised 
along the segment ED in Figure 1.1. Incentivizing monitoring is more expen­
3In simultaneous group lending, the lender lends 2 units of capital and expects to 
get an output of 27rhx. In sequential group lending, the lender expects to lend (1 + irh) 
units of capital and get an output valued at Trh( l  +  7xh)x. He pays the borrowers 2bss 
with probability Txh<1 in both cases. Consequently, the lender pays the borrower b3S and 
2 bss per unit of capital lent in simultaneous and sequential group lending respectively.
l + 7 T h’
4AB and OC intersect at c = which is at a height greater than B ( 0).
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sive in simultaneous group lending. This is because to incentivise monitoring, 
the lender has to satisfy the group’s collective incentive compatibility con­
dition along the segment AB. In contrast, in sequential group lending, the 
tasks need to be incentivised individually. Monitoring gets incentivised along 
segment OC.
ss
B{ 0)
B ( c)
sim seq
Figure 1.1: Monitoring Intensities in Group Lending
High effort would be implemented in simultaneous and sequential group 
lending if the payoffs were above the segments EHB and EGC respectively. 
The lender’s problem gets solved at H in simultaneous and at G in sequential 
group lending. Consequently, the borrower’s payoff is higher in simultaneous 
as compared to sequential group lending. The corollary to proposition 3 
follows.
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C oro llary  1. In sequential group lending, the group’s collective incentive 
compatibility condition is slack.
The group’s collective incentive compatibility condition gets satisfied at 
H in Figure 1.1. The lender offers the borrower a contract at G. It is clear 
that the group’s collective incentive compatibility condition is slack at G.
1.4.4 Collusion
Colluding does not require any side-contracting ability in the simultaneous 
group lending. The borrowers take their monitoring and effort decisions 
simultaneously and consequently incur the cost of monitoring and obtain 
private benefits, simultaneously.
Conversely, colluding in sequential group lending is not trivial given that 
the decision on actions are separated temporally. The borrowers incur their 
monitoring costs and obtain private benefits at different points in time. Thus, 
to collude, they need to be able to sign and enforce contracts across time. 
For instance, by not monitoring, B\ (B 2 ) saves on monitoring costs at t = 4 
(t =  1) and f?2 (Bi)  obtains the private benefits from low effort at t = 5 
(t = 2). The subgame(s) of the sequential group lending game is (are) almost 
identical to the delegated monitoring case we analysed above.
In group lending, the group’s incentive compatibility condition (1.9) is 
also the no-collusion condition. Given that in the simultaneous group lend­
ing, the borrowers do not need any ability to side contract to be able to 
coordinate on the no-monitoring low-effort equilibrium, the lender has to en­
sure that (1.9) is always satisfied. Otherwise, simultaneous group lending is 
not feasible.
Conversely, as we know from corollary 1, the group’s collective incentive 
compatibility condition is slack in sequential group lending and the borrowers
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would benefit from colluding i.e. coordinating on the no-monitoring low-effort 
equilibrium.
Given that monitoring costs and private benefits are non-pecuniary, the 
borrowers would collude if either (a) the non-pecuniary costs and benefits 
were transferable amongst them or (b) if they had the ability to sign and 
enforce side contract across time. Consequently, the lender is able to ex­
ploit the group’s inability to fully side-contract over time in sequential group 
lending to lower the borrower’s rents.
1.5 Group lending with varying efficiency of 
M onitoring Technology
In this section we examine the effect of varying the efficiency of the monitor­
ing technology. We introduce a parameter (3 which measures the efficiency 
of the monitoring technology. Higher values of (3 are associated with greater 
efficiency of the monitoring technology. We impose the following additional 
assumption on the monitoring function B(c, (3).
A ssum ption  3 (Monitoring function B(c,{3)).
i. B(0,f3) = B o > 0  V ( 3 ^ 0
ii. B(c,(3) is continuous and at least once differentiable V/?,c ^  0
iii. B c{c,(3) < 0, 5 ^ c ^ ) < 0 V f t c ) 0
For any given /?, x Sim and x seq, the least productive projects financed
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under simultaneous and sequential group lending respectively, are given by
Xsim = ~h + [B(Csim,(3)] (1.15)
=  +  (1 +  (1.16)
where csim and cseq are defined by (1.11) and (1.13) respectively.
P ro p o sitio n  4. As the monitoring technology becomes more efficient, a 
greater range of projects is feasible under both group lending mechanisms.
B{ 0,0)
oc£(0,j3)
O
Figure
j3t
 ^ c . r  <sim seq
1.2: cSim and cseq as Monitoring Efficiency Varies
We see the effects of a more efficient monitoring technology on the bor­
rower’s payoff in Figure 1.2. In Appendix 1.9.1, we show th a t as monitoring 
technology becomes more efficient (/3 increases), the borrowers in both group
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lending mechanism get lower rents. x Sim and x 3eq decrease as the lender is 
able to finance lower productivity projects.
Proposition 5. With an extremely efficient monitoring technology (ft —* oo), 
siome socially viable projects are not feasible with simultaneous group lending, 
wjhereas all socially viable projects are feasible under sequential group lending.
In Appendix 1.9.2, we show as (3 —> oo, x Sim —*■ and x seq ->
Consequently, x  G [^ r5 +  af  ^ ) is the set of socially viable projects that
are not feasible in simultaneous group lending because of the rents allocated 
to  the borrowers to satisfy the group’s collective incentive compatibility con­
dition (1.9).
1.5.1 Linear M onitoring Technology
Further, with a linear monitoring technology of the form B (c , (5) =  B(0)-/3-c, 
we can find the conditions under which sequential group lending finances a 
greater range of projects than simultaneous group lending.
Proposition 6. When monitoring technology is linear, we can show that if 
the monitoring technology is sufficiently efficient, a greater range of projects 
get financed with sequential as compared to simultaneous group lending.
In Appendix 1.9.3, we show that if /3 ^  — (2 — ~) +  '^/(2 — ^ ) 2 +  4(k — 1) > 
0, then x Sim ^  x seq. (where k =  That is, with a sufficiently high /?, a
greater range of projects are feasible with sequential group lending as com­
pared to sequential group lending. This is because even though the borrower’s 
rents are lower in sequential group lending, punishing the group when B\ s 
project fails implies that the lender pays more per unit capital lent to the 
group, thus lowering his capital’s productivity. Thus, for low values of (3, the
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difference in the borrower’s rents are overwhelmed by the difference in the 
productivity of the lender’s capital.
1.6 Conclusion
We compare the sequential lending mechanism with the simultaneous lending 
mechanism. In the simultaneous group lending mechanism, the lender has to 
leave the borrowers sufficient rents to satisfy the group’s collective incentive 
compatibility. Given that the borrowers make their monitoring and effort 
choices simultaneously, the lender has to incentivise the group’s decisions on 
the two tasks, monitoring and effort, collectively.
Alternatively, the loans could be disbursed sequentially within the group 
with the proviso that the second borrower gets the loan only if the first 
borrower succeeds. W ith sequential group lending, the borrower’s effort and 
monitoring decisions are temporally separated. We show that in this case, the 
lender does not have to satisfy the group’s collective incentive compatibility 
condition. Thus, once the decisions are temporally separated, only the more 
expensive of the two tasks has to be incentivised.
Satisfying the group’s collective incentive compatibility condition requires 
that the lender leaves the borrowers higher rents in the simultaneous as 
opposed to sequential group lending. Thus, the advantage of lending se­
quentially in the group is that the lender has to allocate lower rents to the 
borrowers. Conversely, the disadvantage is that punishing the group for the 
first borrower’s project failure is expensive. It lowers the productivity of the 
lender’s capital.
We find that for sufficiently efficient monitoring technology, a greater 
range of projects are feasible under sequential group lending. W ith a suffi­
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ciently efficient monitoring technology, the difference in the productivity of 
capital is overwhelmed by the difference in the borrower rents in the two 
group lending mechanisms. Consequently, some socially viable projects that 
are infeasible under simultaneous group lending are feasible under sequential 
group lending.
Conversely, if the monitoring technology is not sufficiently efficient, a 
greater range of projects are feasible under simultaneous group lending. The 
difference in the borrower’s rents under the two group lending mechanism 
decreases as the monitoring technology becomes less efficient.
Further, the borrower’s ability to collude through side contracting is ir­
relevant in simultaneous group lending. If the group’s collective incentive 
compatibility condition is satisfied, the group does not benefit from collud­
ing. In sequential group lending, the group’s collective incentive compati­
bility condition remains slack. If the borrowers have an unlimited ability to 
side contract, they would benefit from colluding in this case. Consequently, 
the lender actually exploits the group’s inability to side contract across time 
to lower the rents left to the borrowers in sequential group lending.
Appendix
1.7 Individual Lending
1.7.1 Individual Lending w ith D elegated M onitoring
The lender offers the borrower a contract (bs, bf) and the monitor a contract 
( w s , W f )  which solves the following problem:
m axi? [xi \ H] — E[bi \ H] — E[wi \ H]
bi yU)%
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subject to E[bi \H]  ^  0 (1*17)
E[bi | H] ^  E[bi | L] +  B (0) (1.18)
bi ^  0; i = s, f  (1.19)
E [ w i \ H ] - c  ^  0 (1.20)
E[wi | if] -  c ^  E[wi | L] (1.21)
Wi ^  0; i = s , f  (1.22)
where (1.17) and (1.20) are the participation constraints, (1.18) and
(1.21), the incentive compatibility constraints and (1.19) and (1.22), the
limited liability constraints of the borrower and the monitor respectively.
In the optimal contract, the borrower’s and monitor’s incentive compat­
ibility constraints bind. Their respective participation constraints remain 
slack and their limited liability constraints bind only in the state / .
Atr{bs -  bf ) = B{0) (1.23)
Air(ws — Wf) =  c (1-24)
wf  — ws — 0; i = s , f  (1-25)
The lender offers the borrower a contract (b*,b*f) and the monitor a con­
tract (wl,w*f).
(1.26) 
(1.27)
where cdm = min (B_1(0), Bc_1( - 1)].
=  fc'  =  0
<  = t z \ <  =  o
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1.8 Group Lending
1.8.1 Sim ultaneous Group Lending
For a subgame £(01, 02), B\ and s respective payoffs from exerting effort 
ei and e2 respectively are given by
For ease of exposition, we use eie^ci, c2) as a shorthand notation to refer 
to a particular outcome where B\ and B\ choose effort levels ei =  ef and 
e2 =  e2 respectively in the subgame £(ci,C2). Thus, for instance, L if(c i,c2) 
refers to a situation where B\ and B 2 choose ci =  C2 and C2 =  C2 at t = 1 
and choose e\ = L  and e2 =  H  at t =  2 respectively. Given our assumption 
of statistical independence of the projects, the likelihood of state s s , given 
the above effort levels, is 7rln h.
Of the game described in Section § 1.4.1, we analyse the subgames f  (c, c), 
f(c, 0), £(0, c) and £(0,0). In the subgame £(c,c), B\ does not deviate from 
HH{c,c)  if
Ifi[ei, e2, Ci, c2] =  E(bij | e i,e2) -  ci 4- B{C2)
n 2[ei, e2, Cl, c2] =  E(bij \ eu  e2) -  c2 + 7Th ~  7T2 
7Th — 7Tl
B(c  1)
where irk = tth if =  H  and =  nl if ek = L.
fli [H, H, c, c] ^  III [L, H , c, c]
(Condition 1)
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B\ does not deviate from LL(c, c) if
III [L, L, c, c] ^  III [H, L, c, c] 
B(c)
7TZA7T
^  6SS (1.28)
In subgame £(c, c), H H ( c , c) and LL(c, c) are Nash Equilibriums if (Con­
dition 1) and (1.28) satisfied. The borrowers would coordinate on HH(c,c)  
if
III [#, # ,  c, c] ^  IIi [L, L, c, c]
>  v f -(C- ; 2-  (1-29)
7T — 7T
In the subgame £(c, 0), Bi does not deviate from HH(c,  0) if 
n i[B ,B ,c ,0 ] ^ II i[L ,tf ,c ,0 ]
L B ( 0 )
Bi does not deviate from LL(c, 0) if
IIi [B, L, c, 0] ^  IIi [H, L , c, 0]
S ( 0 )  ^  h
tHAtT ^
B2 does not deviate from HH(c,  0) if
II2[B ,B ,c,0] ^ n i[L ,B ,c ,0 ]  
ss irhA n
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£?2 does not deviate from LL(c, 0) if
n 2[L, I/, c, 0] ^  IIi [H, L, c, 0] 
B(c)
7TlA7T
Thus, in the subgame £(c, 0), LL(c , 0) is the only Nash Equilibrium if the 
following condition is met
bss < jt'*Att ^ ' 3°^
By symmetry, (1.30) would also ensure that LL(0,c) is the only Nash 
Equilibrium in the subgame £(0,c).
In the subgame £(0,0), B\ does not deviate from H H (0,0) if
0 , 0]
"  tt'-Att 
S i does not deviate from LL(0,0) if
S(0)
7rZA7T
In the subgame £(0,0), LL(0,0) is the only Nash Equilibrium if (1.30) is 
satisfied.
Moving up the game tree, c would be the best response to c if 
IIi [H, H , c, c] ^  max ^IIi[L, L, c, 0], IIi[L, L, 0, c]^
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The condition given above would be satisfied if the following two condition 
are satisfied.
Ili [H, H, c, c] ^  III [L, L, c, 0]
(1.31)
III [H, H, c, c] ^  III [L, L , 0, c]
(1.32)
This leaves us with HH(c,c)  and LL(0,0). The borrower’s would prefer 
HH( c , c) over LL(0,0) if
IIi[tf,tf ,c ,c ] ^  n i[L ,L ,0, 0]
Condition 1, together with (1.28) and (1.30) give us a range for bss. 
Condition 1 gives us the lower bound for the range. The upper bound of 
the range is given by either (1.28) or (1.30). Given that the lender’s objec­
tive is to minimise the borrower’s payoffs, he would ignore the upper bound. 
Further, if Condition 2 is satisfied, then (1.29), (1.31) and (1.32) would also 
be satisfied.
Consequently, if Condition 1 and Condition 2 are satisfied, the desired 
outcome is the SPNE of the game.
(Condition 2)
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1.8.2 Sequential Group Lending
B\ and J32’s respective final payoffs are:
n i[e i,e2,c i,c 2] =  7ri[7r2sss +  (1 -  7r2)ssf] -  a  +  (1 -  7Ti)sf  +  
n 2[ei,e2,c i,c 2] =  7Ti[7r2sss +  (1 -  7r2)ssf} -  c2 +  (1 -  7n )sf  +
rTTk — 7Ti 
7Th — 7Tl 
7rh — 7Ti
7Th ~  7Tl
B ( c 2) 
B(c  i)
where 7Tjt =  tt 1^ if e*, =  H  and 7 =  7rz if e*, =  L. In the subgame £(c2, ei), 
B 2 chooses high effort level (e2 =  H) at t = 5 and B \ chooses positive 
monitoring intensity (ci >)0 at t = 4 if the following conditions hold:
n2 [m ,h ,c i, c2\ ^  n2 [7ri, l, cx, c2] 
n2[7Ti, # , 0 , C2] < n2[7Ti, L, 0 , C2] 
III[tti, //”,Ci,c2] ^ IIi[7ri,L, 0,c2\
(1.33)
(1.34)
(1.35)
If (1.33) and (1.35) are satisfied but (1.34) is not satisfied, B 2 would choose 
high effort at t = 5 in spite of B\ choosing monitoring intensity Ci =  0 at 
t = 4. Thus, it makes (1.34) irrelevant.
(1.33) and gives us the following condition.
S§f ^
B(c  i)
7Ti A7T
(1.36)
(1.35) gives us
$ss $sf ^
Cl
7Ti A7T
(1.37)
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(1.36) and (1.37) can be summarised as:
sss -  ssf ^  max [B(ci), Ci]
For the lender, ss is the most informative state. Rewarding the agent 
in state s f , when B 2 s project fails is unnecessary. The lender can let the 
limited liability condition bind for ssf  and set is to zero. The above condition 
can be restated as
sss ^  —t — m ax[R(ci),ci] (1.38)7TiZA7r
B\  chooses high effort level (ei =  H)  at t = 2 and B 2 chooses positive 
monitoring intensity (C2 > 0) at t  = 1, if the following conditions hold:
U i [H,H, cu c2] ^  Ui [L,H, ci, c2] (1.39)
U^H^H^cu  0] ^  IIi[L ,tf,c i, 0] (1.40)
U2[H,H, cu c2] ^  n2[L,L, 0, 0] (1.41)
Again, if (1.39) and (1.41) are satisfied but (1.40) is not satisfied, B\  
would choose high effort at t = 2 in spite of B 2 choosing monitoring intensity 
c2 = 0 at t = 1. Thus, it makes (1.40) irrelevant.
(1.39) gives us
+  (1 "^2)^s/ Sf ^
B ( c2)
A n
(1.42)
(1.41) gives us
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7^ 2 &ss ( 1  ^2 ) $ s f  S f  ^ (1.43)
(1.42) and (1.43) give us
7Ths ss +  ( 1  -  7rh)ssf  -  s f ^  ^ m a x [ £ ( c 2 ) , c 2] ( )
Again, ss is the most informative state. Rewarding the borrowers in state 
s f  and /  is unnecessary. The lender can let the limited liability condition 
bind for s sf  and s / and set them to zero. The above condition can be restated 
as
Sss ^  ma:X: [^ (C2)’ °21 (1*44)
(1.38) and (1.44) give us
Sss ^  —rx— max [B(c), cl (Condition 3)
irn/ \ n
If this condition holds, it ensures that the game would have a SPNE in 
which both borrowers would monitor their respective peers with sufficient 
intensity to ensure that both borrowers in turn exert high effort.
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1.9 Varying Efficiency of M onitoring
1.9.1 Least Productive Project Financed
cSim and cseq are defined by B(csim,(3) = a(B(0)  + csirri) and B(cseq,(3) = cseq 
and respectively. From these conditions we can obtain tha t rate at which 
csirn and cseq change as (3 changes.
dc •
~d0
13piCsirn)
& Bc^Csim)
Bp(cseq) 
d(3 1 B c{cs
dcseq
(1.45)
(1.46)
We can find the rate at which x Sim and x seq change by substituting
dcand from the above expressions.
dXgij
~dP
dx
a
A n
seq
d(3 A n{nh +  1)
Bp{cseq)
_ 1 B c(cseq) _
(1.47)
(1.48)
As monitoring technology become more efficient {(3 increases), a greater 
range of projects get financed under both simultaneous and sequential group 
lending.
1.9.2 Sim ultaneous and Sequential Group Lending with  
an Extrem ely Efficient M onitoring Technology
The monitoring technology become extremely efficient as (3 —► 0.
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W ith an extremely efficient monitoring technology, the lender induces negli­
gible amounts of monitoring in the group members.
lim B(csim,/3) =  a B (0) (1-51)
f3—*00
lim B(cseq,0) = 0 (1.52)/3—+00
In sequential group lending the borrower’s private benefits are driven 
down to almost 0 where as in simultaneous group lending, they remain pos­
itive due to the scope for collusion amongst the borrowers.
lim x sim = ( I . 5 3 )
/?—>00 7Th A n
lim x seq = (1.54)
/3—>oo 7T
With borrowers retaining almost no rents in sequential group lending, all
socially viable projects are feasible. In simultaneous group lending, due to
the rents that borrowers retain, some projects namely x  G +
are not feasible.
1.9.3 Linear M onitoring Technology
W ith the linear monitoring technology, B(c,(3) = B{0) — (3c, we can find the 
values of and Cgtm.
1 — a
_(3 +  OL -^(0) j Cseq _ 1 +  (3 _
B ( 0)
We look for conditions under which greater range of projects are financed 
under sequential group lending.
sim ^  •X'seq
a ( B ( 0) +  csirn) ^  k • cseq where k = — — r
1 +  7rn
Substituting the values of cSim and cseq gives us following condition in terms 
of (3.
0 2 +  (2 -  - ) /?  -  (k -  1) >  0
a
Using the positive root of the quadratic equation, we find that the above 
condition is met when
-  e > - ( 2 - k« )  +  n 2 - k* )
The right hand side is always positive since k > 1.
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Chapter 2 
The C asestudy
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we document a variation of the simple group lending mecha­
nism used by a Microfinance Institution (Mfl) in the Indian state of Haryana. 
We look at the distinctive features of this group lending mechanism. The 
objective of the exercise is to understand how the particular group lending 
mechanism helps the Mfl solve the information problems associated with 
lending to the poor.
The Mfl in Haryana works under the guidelines of the Self Help Group 
(SHG) Linkage Programme, India’s decade old national microfinance pro­
gramme. The SHG Linkage Programme was designed to encourage Mfls to 
enter and fill the gaps in the rural financial markets across the country.
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2.2 Background
2.2.1 Rural Banking in India
The nationalisation of India’s fourteen major commercial banks in 1969 paved 
way for what came to be know as the social and development banking. The 
objective was to increase rural access to banking services and target credit 
at some specific activities and certain disadvantaged groups. The Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI) pursued these objectives by imposing ceilings on interest 
rates and setting specific targets for expansion of rural branches and sectoral 
allocation of credit.
In 1991, this policy was reversed after the Narsimhan Committee Report 
suggested “phasing out the directed credit programmes, deregulating the 
interest rates and revoking the branch licensing policy.” (Narasimhan, 1991). 
It was felt that by encumbering the banking sector with social objectives, 
the state was restricting the banking sector from competing in the global 
economy.
India started the slow but steady process of dismantling its social and de­
velopment banking policies. By some accounts, the policy had enjoyed some 
success since its inception in the late 1970s. “Between bank nationalization 
in 1969 and the onset of financial liberalization in 1990, bank branches were 
opened in over 30,000 rural locations which had no prior presence of commer­
cial banks” and the “Indian rural branch expansion programme significantly 
lowered rural poverty.” (Burgess and Pande, 2004)
The 1990s saw a contracting rural banking network in line with the rec­
ommendation of the Narsimhan Committee Report. To compensate for this, 
there was a need to find a new method of disbursing credit to the rural poor, 
which would be compatible with the spirit of deregulation.
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2.2.2 The Self Help Group Linkage Program m e
The Self Help Group (SHG) Linkage Programme initiated by the National 
Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) emerged as a so­
lution. The pre-existing rural banking network was incorporated in the pro­
gramme. The programme adhered closely to the principle espoused by other 
microfinance programmes, namely making financial services available to the 
poor.
Since 1999, India has seen a phenomenal rise in the number of self help 
groups being formed and subsequently linked to the conventional banking 
network under this programme. There has been a ten fold increase between 
1999 and 2004 in the number of groups that have been linked by the SHG 
programme. (Table 2.1)
Table 2.1: Growth of Self Help Group Linkage Programme in India
Self Help Groups Loans to Self Help Groups*
Year Number Growth Cumm. Amount Growth Cumm.
1992-1999 32,995 32,995 570 570
1999-2000 81,780 148% 114,775 1360 138% 1,930
2000-2001 149,050 82% 263,825 2880 112% 4,810
2001-2002 197,653 33% 461,478 5450 89% 10,260
2002-2003 255,882 29% 717,360 10,220 87% 20,490
2003-2004 361,731 41% 1079,091 18,550 81% 39,040
Source: Government of India, Economic Survey, 2003-04
* Figures in Rs. million; £1.00 =  Rs. 79;
2.3 The Fieldwork
The objective of the fieldwork was to analyse how the SHG group lending 
mechanism solves the information problems associated with providing finan­
cial services to the poor. With this objective in mind, we studied the group
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Microfinance
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Figure 2.1: Flow of Funds
lending mechanism used by a particular Mfl working under the guidelines of 
the SHG Linkage programme guidelines.
The fieldwork for this study took place in August 2004 in the tehsil of 
H athin1 in the Indian state of Haryana. We interviewed 54 members from 
5 self help group in the area. These self help groups had been formed by 
Society of Promotion of Youth and Masses (SPYM), a New Delhi based Mfl 
working in the area for the last eight years. In tha t period, they have formed 
300 groups in the area and have a presence in all 84 villages of Hathin. SPYM 
works with women-only groups and so all our interviewees were women. The 
groups we interviewed were about 18 months old. We set out the precise 
group lending mechanism used by SPYM in detail below.
!The tehsil of Hathin is part of district Faridabad. For the purpose of administration, 
a state is divided into districts which is divided further into tehsil.
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2.3.1 The Group Lending M echanism
In accordance with the SHG Linkage Programme guidelines, the Mfl encour­
ages individuals to form a group of 15 to 20 members. Once the group is 
formed, the members contribute a fixed amount every month to the group’s 
saving pot. The group opens an account in the local rural bank and the 
contributions to the saving pot are deposited each month in this account.
The guidelines suggest that there is moratorium on borrowing from the 
saving pot for the first five months during which the saving pot is allowed 
to accumulate. After this period, the members petition the group for loans 
and the group decides who gets to borrow first from the saving pot. Since 
the borrower is borrowing from the members of the group, we will henceforth 
refer to this kind of loan as the internal loan and interest rate charged on the 
loan as the internal interest rate. The loan has to be fully repayed back in 
10 installments over a 10 month period. The interest earned on the internal 
loan is shared equally amongst the group members.
Two months after the first internal loan, the group can lend its savings 
to a second borrower from the group. For each loan, the members petition 
the group and the group as a whole decides who gets the loan. The group 
is encouraged to keep detailed accounts of the savings contributions and 
the loan repayments each month. These accounts, in conjunction with the 
group’s bank account activity, starts the process of creating a credit history 
for the group.
If the group is able to enforce timely repayment on the first two internal 
loans, the Mfl arranges an external loan for the group from either one of the 
numerous subsidised government lending programmes or a public bank. We 
refer to the interest rate charged on the external loan as the external interest 
rate.
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The external loan is made to the group as a whole. The group then allo­
cates it to a borrower in the group. Each subsequent external loan is approved 
on the basis of the group’s repayment history on the internal and external 
loans. Like the internal loan, the external loan has to be fully repayed in 10 
installments over a 10 month period. Though, for a external loan, a direct 
debit is setup for repayment of the loan at the time the loan is disbursed. 
Every month, the rural bank automatically deducts the installments on all 
outstanding external loans from the group’s account. It is the responsibility 
of the group to ensure that the borrowers deposit their installment in the 
group’s account. If the borrowers fail to do so, the group’s saving pot get 
depleted.
The rules of the SHG Linkage Programme explicitly forbid the Mfl from 
engaging in financial intermediation. The group’s saving has to be deposited 
in the local rural bank and any external loan has to be transacted exclusively 
through the local rural bank. The Mfl’s remuneration for forming the groups 
and linking it to the external sources of credit is tied to repayment of the 
external loans. Part of the interest payment on the external loan made by 
the borrower goes to the Mfl.
2.3.2 The Group Contract
The Mfl proposes the following three elements of the group contract at the 
time of group formation.
1. The amount each group member is required to save each month
2. The length of the repayment period for the internal and external loans
3. The internal interest rate charged on the internal loans
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The group is formed if the group members agree to these three elements of the 
group contract as proposed by the Mfl. The Mfl has no control on external 
interest rate as it is determined by the external source of credit, i.e. the public 
bank or government in the case of a subsidised lending programme.
2.3.3 Terms of the Loan
In each of the 10 monthly installments, a borrower is required to repay back 
one tenth of the principal along with the interest accrued on the principal 
owed hitherto. For a loan amount of L, the installment due in month t 
would be ^  +  1°~1q~1^ * {2  L  w^ere r  is the yearly interest rate charged on 
the loan.
The interest rate varies according to the source of the credit. In our study, 
we found that the groups were able to obtain external loans at 18% per cent 
per annum. The group’s internal funds were lent out to its members at 24% 
per annum.
On an external loan of Rs. 10,000 (£  125.00),2 the first month’s install­
ment would be Rs. 1,150 (£  14.375). Each subsequent installment would 
be Rs. 15 (18.75 pence) less, till the loan is paid off in the tenth month. 
On an internal loan of same amount, the first month’s installment would 
be Rs. 1,200 (£  15.00) and each subsequent installment would be Rs. 20 (25 
pence) less, till the loan is paid off in the tenth month.
The group member’s monthly contribution to the saving pot varied from 
group to group. In our sample this varied from Rs. 200 (£2.50) to Rs. 100 
(£1.25). To put these amounts in context, the poorest group members in 
our sample were agricultural labourers, whose daily wage was approximately 
Rs. 100.
2This was the mode and median of the loans in our study, £1 = Rs. 80
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The primary sources of external credit were the Rashtriya Mahila Kosh 
(RMK), the National Minorities Development Finance Corporation (NMDFC) 
and the the public banks. Part of the interest payment on the external loans 
was retained by the Mfl. Depending on the source of the loan, the Mfl’s 
margin on the external loans varied between 6% and 10%.
2.3.4 Saver’s Prem ium
It is notable tha t the interest rate charged on the internal loans was con­
siderably higher than the interest rates charged on external loans. This is 
in line with the findings in Chavan and Ramakumar (2005). They find that 
the internal interest rate is always higher than external interest for the SHG 
groups across India. Studies like Harper (1998), Harper (2002), Gaiha (2001), 
Puhazhendi and Satyasai (2000) and Puhazhendi and Badatya (2002), which 
have looked at the SHG group across India, have come to a similar conclusion.
Whilst analysing the internal structure of a cooperative, where members 
of the cooperative borrow both internally and externally, Banerjee et al. 
(1994) shows tha t a premium needs to be paid on the internally borrowed 
funds. The premium ensures that the net saver’s have an incentive to par­
ticipate in the cooperative. It compensates the net savers for monitoring the 
net borrowers and bearing the liability for the net borrowers failure to repay.
2.3.5 Potential Investm ent Projects
In the interviews, most of the group members said that they had joined the 
group with the objective of buying a buffalo. There are a number of privately 
owned dairies in the area which source their milk from the villages in Hathin. 
Consequently, investing in a buffalo was perceived to be a safe investment as 
there was a well established market for its produce.
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A buffalo could cost anywhere between Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 15,000. The more 
expensive the buffalo, the more milk it produced per day. The milk could be 
sold to the local dairy at anywhere between Rs. 4 to Rs. 6 per litre. All the 
group members that reported borrowing for investment purposes, claimed to 
have bought a buffalo.
2.3.6 Borrower’s Stake in the Project
Lets take a typical example of a borrower taking an external loan of Rs. 10,000 
to buy a buffalo of that amount. At 18% per annum, the borrower is required 
to repay Rs. 1150 after the first month. Given a buffalo’s typical milk pro­
duction, which the borrower sells at Rs. 5 per litre, the borrower can expect 
to have a surplus of Rs. 30 per day. The borrower would have a shortfall 
of Rs. 400 in the first month and a shortfall of Rs. 265 in the tenth month. 
Thus, the borrower cannot expect to repay the loan just using the proceeds 
from the investment project.
Assuming that the borrower is able to earn 24% (the internal interest 
rate) on her savings at all points in time, the borrower would require to 
have savings of at least Rs. 3008.71 to start with in order to stick to the 
repayment schedule of the loan. Thus, shortening the repayment period 
forces the borrower to use her savings to repay the loan. To make repayments 
on time, the borrowers require sufficient initial savings to start with. That 
is, unless they plan on defaulting on their installments.
2.4 Solving the Information Problem s
This section discusses the way in which the SHG group lending mechanism 
solves the information problems associated with lending to the poor.
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2.4.1 Enforcing Joint Liability
The SHG mechanism is able to impose full and immediate joint liability on 
the group members. If a particular borrower fails to repay on time, the group 
members and in particular the members that do not have any outstanding 
loans, are penalised, fully and immediately. At any given point in time, the 
non-borrowers effectively cover for the late payment by the borrowers in the 
group. The Mfl is thus able to impose joint liability by restricting the number 
of members that can borrow at point in time in the group.
In conventional groups, where all members borrow simultaneously, im­
posing joint liability on the group members is not trivial. It has been argued 
that the Mfl imposes joint liability by threatening to barr the group’s and 
its individual member’s access to future credit in response to an individual 
member’s delinquency. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999, pg. 214) illustrate this 
with an example from the Grameen Bank. “All borrowers accept the threat 
that if their group does not fully repay its loans, then all members are cut 
off from future credit from this lender.”
SPYM’s accounts showed that 97% of the groups had made timely re­
payment. In the 3% of case, there were delays in repayment but no default. 
There has never been any reported instance of a late payment in the 5 groups 
we studied.
2.4.2 A ctive Screening
The Mfl assigns a Community Development Officer (CDO) to each group. 
The CDO attends the weekly meetings of the group and clarifies any doubts 
the group members may have. Attending the weekly meeting gives the CDO 
an opportunity to observe how the group functions. For an outside observer,
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observing the weekly group meeting can convey important information about 
the group’s social cohesion and it’s ability to administer itself. This and other 
relevant information collated by the CDO helps the Mfl assess the group’s 
ability to enforce timely repayments on external loans.
Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) classify this kind of screening as active screening 
as it “entails lenders (a) expending resources in actively screening applicants 
(groups) . . .  and (b) limiting the range of their lending activity to mem­
bers of a particular kinship group, residents of a given region or individuals 
with whom they trade.” This kind of screening is distinct from the passive 
screening mechanism which works though the design of contracts (interest 
rate, loan size and extent of joint liability) and encourages the borrowers or 
groups to self select.
Given that the Mfl is not the financial intermediary, it does not have full 
control on the terms of contract it offers the groups. The external interest rate 
is set either by the government lending agencies like the RMK and NMFDC 
at the national level or by the respective public banks. Consequently, the 
Mfl is constrained in its ability to screen the groups passively and relies more 
on active screening.
I was able to observe the Mfl’s cost associated with active screening. I 
frequently accompanied the CD Os in their visits to group meetings. The 
CDO would observe the weekly meeting, interrupting only to clarify rules 
regarding accounting and saving. The CDOs tended to address the meeting 
at the end, to impress upon the group that their access to future credit hinges 
on their ability to efficiently self govern.
As Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) suggests in (b) above, the Mfl, by tying-in 
the groups with a mandatory saving scheme, encourages the formation of the 
group on which it intends to concentrate its future lending activity.
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It is well documented that the Mfl, as an outsider, has a disadvantage 
in terms of cost of acquiring local information, as compared to the various 
participants in the local informal markets. With the SHG mechanism, the 
Mfl is able to economise on the resources expended in screening actively. 
The CDO is able to gather information about the group and its members 
merely by attending successive weekly meetings and examining the accounts 
maintained by the group. Consequently, the SHG mechanism allows the Mfl 
to acquire information about the group inexpensively and allows the groups 
to exhibit their ability to administer themselves as a financial entity before 
any funds are lent to them.
2.4.3 Peer M onitoring and A uditing
The SHG mechanism is able to induce peer monitoring by restricting the 
number of borrowers that borrow simultaneously in the group.
Sequential Lending
There is a moratorium on lending for approximately the first five months. 
Once the lending starts, credit is allocated sequentially within the group and 
the group decides the sequence in which the borrowers get credit.
All group members that do not have outstanding loans have incentives to 
monitor the present borrower(s). Their saving is jeopardised if the current 
borrower(s) do not repay on time or default. Further, for the borrowers 
waiting for credit in the near future, the incentive to monitor and audit are 
even stronger. They would like to ensure that they get a chance to borrow.
In our study we found that at any given point in time there are always 
group members that have no loans outstanding. (See Table 2.2) W ith joint 
liability, the threat of losing their accumulated savings gives the peers in­
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centives to monitor the borrower. It ensures that the loaned funds are used 
judiciously and the repayments are made on time.
Table 2.2: Number of Group Members with Outstanding Loans
Month Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 1
4 0 0 1 0 3
5 0 1 1 0 5
6 1 1 1 0 5
7 1 1 1 3 5
8 2 2 1 3 5
9 2 5 1 4 5
10 2 5 1 5 5
11 3 6 3 5 5
12 4 7 5 5 5
13 7 8 5 6 5
14 9 8 4 6 4
15 9 8 4 8 3
16 10 7 4 8 4
17 9 8 6 8 4
18 10 9 6 7 5
Total Membership 16 17 17 17 16
At any given point in time, these incentives are sharper for a non-borrower 
i as compared to a member j  who has an outstanding loan, j  has compar­
atively less to lose if another borrower defaults and the group collapses. By 
strategically defaulting, j  may lose access to future credit but also escapes 
the current repayment obligations. Conversely, i would loose part of her sav­
ing as well as access to future credit. Thus, the non-borrower member i has 
sharper incentives to monitor and audit her peers than the borrower j .
Restricting the number of simultaneous borrowers in the group induces a 
greater amount of aggregate monitoring in the group. The tight repayment 
schedule implies tha t the borrowers require sufficient cash wealth to be able
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to borrow in the first place. Consequently, only members of the groups that 
have sufficient cash wealth can petition the group to borrow. Table 2.4.3 
shows us that after 18 months almost a third of each group has not yet 
borrowed.
Table 2.3: No. of Non-borrowing Members in the Group 
(after 18 months of group formation)
Group Members
Total Not Borrowed Yet
Group 1 16 5
Group 2 17 7
Group 3 17 7
Group 4 17 7
Group 5 16 6
Restricting the number of simultaneous borrowers creates a intra-group 
demand for credit. Consequently, this gives the relatively well off3 incentive 
to group with the poor in an effort to reduce the demand for credit within 
the group. Table 2.4 gives us an idea of the extent of income heterogeneity 
in the groups.
Table 2.4: Income Heterogeneity in the Group 
(after 18 months of group formation)
Wealthiest Poorest
Group Member’s Member’s
Income! Income!
Group 1 Rs. 36,000 Rs. 15,000
Group 2 Rs. 72,000 Rs. 18,000
Group 3 Rs. 110,000 Rs. 10,000
Group 4 Rs. 60,000 Rs. 10,000
Group 5* Rs. 76,000 Rs. 24,000
! Annual income in Rupees where £1 = Rs. 80
individuals that have sufficient initial cash wealth to borrow in the group but not 
enough cash wealth to borrow individually
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Table 2.5 shows us that the wealthy members in each group receive dis­
proportionate amounts of loans in each group. The only exception is group 5 
where the richest two members of the group had already borrowed extensively 
from another group.4
Table 2.5: Wealthy Member’s Borrowing as a Proportion of Total Borrowing 
(after 18 months of group formation)
Group Borrowing
2 Wealthiest 4 Wealthiest 6 Wealthiest
Total* Member’s Member’s Member’s
Proportion Proportion Proportion
Group 1 107,800 43.56% 52.50% 54.29%
Group 2 99,000 13.64% 21.72% 44.45%
Group 3 135,500 52.03% 59.41% 66.79%
Group 4 28,000 27.94% 38.23% 44.70%
Group 5* 65,000 1.73% 32.03% 49.35%
t in Rupees where £1 = Rs. 80
* Group 5’s wealthy members had borrowed extensively from another 
older group.
2.5 Conclusions
The objective of this exercise was to examine the group lending mechanism 
used by the SHG Linkage Programme. We were also able to analyse how the 
SHG mechanism solves the information problems associated with lending to 
the poor. We examined how implementing full and immediate joint liability 
and restricting the number of simultaneous borrowers in a group enhances 
the SHG mechanism’s ability to screen the group and give the group members 
incentive to peer monitor. Along with giving the poor access to credit, the 
mechanism also allows the poor to obtain a premium on their savings.
4This was the only instance we observed of the individuals being members of more than 
one group simultaneously.
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C hapter 3 
A n A nalysis o f Saving  
O pportunities in Group  
Lending
3.1 In troduction
The paper examines the long held view in microfinance th a t subsidising the 
cost of capital is an effective way of helping the poorest. We show th a t 
subsidising the cost of capital harms the ability of the poorest to join the 
groups in a group lending microfinance programmes.
We have a standard moral hazard environment with costly monitoring in 
which the lender influences the borrower’s effort choice by requiring her to 
partly self-finance her project. The lender can use wealth to engender peer 
monitoring by lending to jointly liable groups. We show th a t in doing so, 
the lender unwittingly provides incentives for the relatively wealthier (yet 
still poor) to group with the poorest. The poorest become equity investors 
(savers) in the relatively-wealthy borrower’s project, giving them  explicit
lenJ>
f t  l l v -
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incentive to monitor the borrower. We analyse how the wealth thresholds to 
participate in the group as savers and borrowers vary with the cost of capital.
The optimal cost of capital, in this case, is the one which allows the 
poorest to join the group as equity investors (savers) and graduate on to 
become borrowers (with a positive probability) in one loan cycle. If the 
government can influence the cost of capital, they should aim for this rate.
In a seminal paper, Ghatak (1999) has shown tha t in an adverse-selection 
framework with joint liability there is positive assortative matching amongst 
the borrowers in a group. That is, the borrowers flock together with their 
own type. The safe-type group with the safe-type and the risky-type with the 
risky-type of borrowers. The lender can screen the borrowers by varying the 
interest rate and the degree of joint liability of the loan contract. We show 
that wealth could be another relevant dimension in group formation and that 
there could be negative assortative matching in this dimension, that is, the 
relatively wealthy individuals group with the poor individuals.
The microfinance literature has hitherto mainly focussed on mechanisms 
that allow the wealth-deprived (collateral-less) individuals to borrow in a 
group. The liability they bear for each other within the group compensates 
for their lack of ownership of stock assets that can serve as collateral. The 
literature, with the exception of Banerjee et al. (1994), has ignored the impli­
cation of offering saving opportunities within the group mechanism. Whilst 
analysing the internal structure of a cooperative, where members of the coop­
erative borrow both internally and externally, Banerjee et al. (1994) shows 
if the funds are borrowed internally, a premium needs to be paid on the 
internally borrowed funds.
Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005, pp. 172) highlight the chang­
ing attitudes towards offering saving opportunities when they write that “mi­
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crofinance practitioner and policymakers are coming around to the view that 
facilitating savings may often be more important than finding better ways to 
lend to low income customers, especially for the most impoverished house­
holds . . .  the two are complementary . . . ”
In our model, the lender decides on three aspects of the contract that 
he offers the group. First, he sets out the extent to which the borrower is 
required to self finance her project. Second, he sets out th e extent to which 
the project should be co-financed by the peer^-Third, he sets out the rate of 
return the peer gets on her capital, used for co-financing the project. This, 
in turn, determines the amount of capital the lender would lend to the group. 
We assume that the market for loanable funds is competitive. Even though 
the lender specifies the rate of return on the.capital he lends, it is effectively 
bounded by his zero profit condition.
We show tha t the relatively wealthy agents prefer to group with poorer 
agents. This is because of two reasons. First, the lender creates intra-group 
competition for credit by allowing only one group member to borrow. With­
out this restriction, all group members would be net borrowers and the lender 
would not be able to induce peer monitoring in this way. Second, given that 
some cash wealth is required to be able to borrow, when the (relatively) 
wealthy group with poor, there is less competition in the group for credit.
The poorest join the group to participate as savers. In return, they obtain 
higher than market returns on their equity investment (savings) in the bor­
rower’s project. (Banerjee et al., 1994) Thus, the premium or higher than 
market return compensates the poor equity investors for their monitoring 
activities.
Further, we analyse how the mechanism’s ability to reach the poorest 
varies with the cost of capital. We find that as the cost of credit is low­
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ered through subsidy, the minimum wealth required to be a borrower is re­
duced. Conversely, with subsidy, the minimum wealth required to be a saver 
is higher. Consequently, subsidy closes the gap between the wealth required 
to be a saver and a borrower.
More and more poor individuals get excluded from participating in group 
lending as the cost of capital is lowered. Though, it increases the chances 
of the ones already participating in group lending to graduate on to becom­
ing borrowers. We solve for the cost of capital at which the group lending 
mechanism can reach the poorest and concurrently ensure that all current 
period savers become borrowers (with a definite probability) in one loan cy­
cle. Thus, at this optimal cost of capital, the premium is high enough that 
the poor savers can enrich themselves sufficiently to be able to borrow in one 
loan cycle.
If the policymakers have the ability to influence the cost of credit, they 
should aim for this optimal rate. Thus, subsidy only helps the poor in this 
group lending mechanism if the cost of credit in the market is higher than 
the optimal rate. Conversely, if the market cost of credit is lower than the 
optimal rate, subsidy harms the interest of the poor.
3.2 M odel
There are two agents. Each agent has access to an identical project which 
requires a lump-sum investment of 1 unit of capital. The project produces 
an uncertain and observable outcome x , valued at x  when it succeeds (s) and 
0 when it fails ( /) .
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3.2.1 A gents
Each agent k is risk neutral, with zero reservation wage income and Wk cash 
wealth. Agents have no collateralizable wealth. (Wk < 1 V k)
Agents may choose to pursue the project with a high (H ) or low (L ) 
effort, which is unobservable to everyone. W ith a high (low) effort, x  is 
realised with probability irh (irl) and 0 with 1 — irh (1 — nl). (7rh > n l)
By exerting low effort, agents obtain a private benefit of value B  from 
the project which is non-pecuniary and non-transferable amongst the agents. 
The private benefits can be curtailed by monitoring, which is undertaken at 
cost c to the monitor. The cost of monitoring is non-pecuniary.
The only connection that agents have amongst themselves is their ability 
to monitor each other and curtail each other’s private benefits. The agents 
can observe the monitoring amongst themselves but it is unobservable to the 
lender. We impose the following assumptions on the monitoring function 
B(c).
Assumption 4 (Monitoring function).
i. B (0) > 0
ii. B(c) is continuous and twice differentiable 
Hi. B'(c) < 0, B"{c) > 0;
3.2.2 Lender
The lender is risk-neutral. The lender does not have the ability to monitor 
or punish the agents in any way, except through their payoffs. The lender 
can costlessly observe the initial capital invested in the project as well as the 
output from the project.
76
t  ' V vAr "
\
vv
,  X >
V  N\ ' *
K
JN>
-11
K x  /
4s V  
\ \
X /
Ho /
P  K
i >  V
3.2.3 Cost o f Capital
The opportunity cost of capital for everyone in the area is p. The lender 
has access to capital at p and the agents can obtain a return of p on their 
savings. The lender faces competition and is unable to earn any rents on his 
lending. Thus, the lender makes zero profit.
3.3 Individual Lending
In this section, we examine the case where an individual borrower undertakes 
a project by investing 1 unit of capital. The lender lends her (1 — Wb) and 
requires that she invest Wb of her own cash wealth in the project.
3.3.1 F irst-Best
As a benchmark, we look at the perfect information case, where the lender 
can observe the borrower’s effort. The lender will be willing to lend (1 — Wb) 
at interest rate r, if it solves the following problem:
max nhr(l  — Wb)Wb
E [ b i \ H ] ^ p w b (3.1)
where p is the opportunity cost of capital and bi the borrowers payoff in state 
i — {5, /} . If the project succeeds, the borrower repays the lender r ( l  — Wb), 
and keeps the rest of the output x  for herself. If the project fails, she gets 
0. Thus, bs = x  — r( 1 — tu&); bf =  0. The borrower’s expected pecuniary 
payoff with effort level j  is E  [bi \ j] =  irj [x — r( 1 — Wb)]. The participation
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constraint (3.1) gives us the minimum wealth required for borrowing.
x — r 
r — ^'TT'*' .
We assume that the lender, due to the competition he faces, is unable 
to obtain an ex ante return on the capital he lends, over and above his 
opportunity cost of capital. Thus, the lender’s zero profit condition (L-ZPC) 
is satisfied if irhr{l — wb) — p{ 1 — wb) giving us
7rh •
(L-ZPC)
At this interest rate, all the borrowers, irrespective of their wealth, can bor­
row. In the first-best world, where effort is observable, there is no minimum 
wealth required for borrowing from the lender if x  ^  that is the project 
is socially viable.
3.3.2 Unobservable Effort
In the first-best world, there is no tension between r and wb because effort 
is observable and thus contractible. The tension between r and wb emerges 
when the effort is unobservable and thus needs to be incentivised.
With unobservable effort, increasing r reduces the borrower’s incentive 
for high effort.1 This can be compensated by increasing wb, the borrower’s 
stake in her own project. Thus, given r, there is a minimum wb required 
for the contract to be incentive compatible. Further, the minimum stake wb 
required by the lender increases with r.
1 Increasing r reduces the borrower’s expected pecuniary payoff from high effort (nh[x — 
r(l — iu&)]) more than from the low effort (nl [x — r(  1 — it^)]), given that 7rh >  n1. This 
reduces her incentive to pursue the project with high effort and lose J3(0), the private 
benefits associated with low effort.
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The lender’s zero profit condition requires that r = Consequently, 
the minimum Wb required for borrowing increases with p, the cost of capital.
3.3.3 Borrower’s Incentive Com patibility Constraint
We add the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint to the lender’s prob­
lem from the previous section.
E[bi | H) > E[bi | L] + B (0) (3.2)
The condition ensures that the borrower has the incentive to pursue the 
project with high effort. The borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint 
(3.2) can be written as
A n x  — B(0) ^  A n r ( l  — Wb) (3.3)
where A n  = n h — n l. The LHS is the net social gain and the RHS is the 
increase in the lender’s expected payoff, from the borrower’s high effort.
The borrower keeps whatever is left of the output after repaying the 
lender. Consequently, the borrower’s incentive for high effort is maintained 
if the lender does not extract more than the net social gain accruing to the 
borrower by exerting high effort. Using the lender’s zero profit condition, we 
obtain
w b ^  1 -
(#)
A n x  — B(0)
A n
The RHS is the lower bound on the borrower’s wealth for a given p, the cost 
of capital.2
2Thus, individual lending is feasible if the project is sufficiently productive, namely
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3.3.4 C on trac t
The lender’s objective function is decreasing in Wb. In order to align the 
borrower’s incentive in his favour, the lender offers the borrower a contract 
(r,wl), requiring the borrower to invest at least wb of her own cash wealth 
in the project where
w l =  1 -
1
(#)
A n x  — B(  0) 
A n
(3.4)
We know from the lender’s objective function that he would like to lend as
individuals 
that can 
borrow
Atc
Figure 3.1: Minimum Wealth Required to Borrow in Individual lending
much as he can to the borrowers and would not let the borrowers invest more 
than that specified by (3.4).
L em m a 2. An agent with wealth greater than wb will accept the lender’s
contract i f  her project is socially viable.
Any agent k with cash wealth wk(^  vu[) will accept the contract (r,w[)  
offered by the lender if
p ( w k - w Ib ) + 'Kh[ x - r { l - w l ) }  ^  pwk
The above condition is satisfied for x  ^  -f^.
P ro p o s it io n  7. w[, the minimum wealth required to borrow from the lender 
increases with p the cost o f capital and decreases with x, the productivity of 
the project.
We can see from Figure 3.1 that as p increases, the borrower’s repayment 
obligation to the lender increases, lowering her incentive for high effort. This 
is compensated by requiring her to have a greater stake in her own project. 
Similarly, we can see that the wealth required to borrow is increaseing in x, 
the productivity of the project.
3.4 G roup Lending
A group is endogenously formed and consists of two agents, a borrower and a 
saver (non-borrower). The borrower is the agent that undertakes the project, 
and the saver the agent that co-finances the project. The lender allows only 
one member of the group to borrow and the group disbands once the project 
outcome is realised.
We assume that the combined cash wealth of the borrower and the saver 
is less than the initial capital required for the project. The agents form a 
group with the purpose of borrowing capital from the lender to enable the 
borrower to undertake her project.
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3.4.1 The Mechanism
The lender specifies the amount of wealth the borrower and the saver are 
required to invest in the project and their respective payoffs in the contract. 
The borrower invests Wb and the saver invests ws in the project. The group 
borrows 1 — (ius 4- Wb), the rest of the capital required for the project, from 
the lender.
Cost o f capital
0
r R
1—w — w.s b ws W b
Source of Capital Lender s Capital Saver s Capital Borrower s Capital
Figure 3.2: Source and Cost of Capital in Group Lending
If the project succeeds, the saver gets a payoff
ss =  Rws
SU
and the lender gets a payoff
ls =  r ( l  - w 8 -  wb).
The borrower’s payoff is
bs = x — Rws — r( 1 — ws — Wb).
That is, the saver gets a return R  on her capital ws and the lender gets a 
return r  on his capital (1 — ws — Wb). The borrower is the residual claimant 
of the output. Conversely, if the project fails, everyone gets 0.
S f  = l f  =  b f  = 0 
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Timing
The timing is as follows:
t = l  The Lender offers a group-contract.
The saver and borrower get contracts (w *,R ) and (w ^r)  respec­
tively.
t= 2  The agents self-select into the roles of the saver and the borrower. 
Subsequently, they pair up to form a group.
t= 3  The group borrows (1 — wl — w*) from the lender.
The Borrower invests 1 unit of capital into the project.
t= 4  The saver chooses her monitoring intensity c.
t= 5  The borrower chooses her effort level.
t= 6  The project outcome is realised.
I f  the project succeeds, the output x  gets distributed as follows. The 
saver and the lender get Rw*s and r( 1 — (w* + w%) respectively and 
the borrower keeps whatever remains. I f  the project fails, everyone 
gets 0.
The borrower’s and monitor’s contracts work in conjunction with each 
other. The borrower’s contract aims to influence her effort choice directly 
through her payoff. The lender is also able to influence the borrower’s effort 
choice indirectly through the saver’s contract. The saver’s contract gives the 
saver incentives to monitor the borrower and curtail her private benefits. An 
optimal contract ensures that the borrower pursues her project with high 
effort.
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3.4.2 The Constraints
The borrower and saver’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints 
are examined below.
B orrow er
The borrower’s participation constraint (B-PC) is given by
7rh [x — r( 1 — ws — Wb) — Rws] ^  pWb (B-PC) -
The condition ensures that the borrower’s return from exerting high effort 
should not be less than the opportunity cost of her cash wealth Wb invested 
in the project. The borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint (B-ICC) is 
given by
7rh [x — r ( l  — ws — Wb) — Rws]
^ 7rl [x — r( 1 — ws — Wb) — Rws] +  B(c) (B-ICC)
The condition ensures that the borrower has the requisite incentive to pursue 
the project with a high effort.
Saver
The saver’s participation constraint (S-PC) is given by
7thR ws — c ^  pws (S-PC)
The condition ensures that the saver’s returns from participating in the group 
and monitoring with intensity c are not less then her returns from investing
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ws in a safe asset. The saver’s incentive compatibility constraint (S-ICC) is 
given by
The condition ensures th a t the saver’s return from inducing the borrower 
to exert high effort on her project by monitoring with intensity c is not less 
than the returns from monitoring with 0 intensity.
3.4.3 Discussion
B orrow er’s D ecision
Given the contracts (R ,w s) and (r,Wb) th a t the lender offers the group, the 
borrower exerts high effort if the following condition is met.
The gain in the borrower’s payoff from a high effort should at least compen-
Given the saver’s contract (R ,w s), the borrower’s incentive compatibility 
constraint gives us the the lower bound on Wb, the minimum wealth required 
for borrowing. Using the lender’s zero profit condition, the borrower’s par­
ticipation constraint can be rewritten as
7rhRw s — c ^  tc1R w s (S-ICC)
A 7t[x  — r ( l  — ws — Wb) — Rw s] ^  B(c) (B-ICC)
sate her for the lost private benefit B(c). This condition can be rewritten
as
(B-ICC)
7xh (x — r) ^  (R  — r) ws (B-PC)
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The condition restricts the total premium tha t the saver gets can get on her 
savings ws, thus effectively restricting the contracts the saver can be offered.
Saver’s D ecision
There are two relevant ranges for R. For R  G ( £ ,  £ ) ,  the saver’s partic­
ipation constraint binds and the incentive compatibility constraint remains 
slack. For R  > the saver’s incentive compatibility constraint binds and 
the participation constraint remains slack. This holds true for all c > 0. 
(S-PC) and (S-ICC) always intersect and bind at R  =
s-icc
B-PC
- S-PC
S-PC binds S-ICC binds
Figure 3.3: Borrower’s and Saver’s Constraints for a given c 
Figure 3.3 shows the saver’s participation and incentive compatibility
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constraint for a positive value of c. The saver’s participation and incentive 
compatibility constraints are violated to the left of the curves. The borrower’s 
participation constraint is violated to the right of the curve.
As discussed above, the borrower’s participation constraint serves to re­
strict the saver’s contract. Thus, any contract which is to the left of the 
(B-PC) in figure 3.3 will satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint. A 
saver’s contract in the area ABCD will satisfy the saver’s incentive compat­
ibility and participation constraint as well as the borrower’s participation 
constraint.
Given an contract (R ,w s), the saver will choose her monitoring intensity 
that would make her participation constraint bind if R  € (^r, and make 
her incentive compatibility constraint bind if R  ^  The borrower would 
choose high effort if her incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied and the 
saver’s contract satisfies her participation constraint. A detailed discussion 
follows in Appendix 3.7.
We can also deduce from Figure 3.3 that for all values of c, if the saver’s 
contract is on the segment AB, the saver’s participation constraint binds 
and the saver gets no rent. The borrower gets positive rents given that her 
participation is slack.
As R  increases, the saver’s contract moves along the segment BC. The 
saver’s rents are increasing in the distance between the saver’s contract and 
saver’s participation constraint. Concurrently, the borrower’s rent decreases 
as the distance between the saver’s contract and the borrower’s participation 
constraint decreases.
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3.4.4 Lender’s Problem
The lender would like to maximise the capital lent to the group (and min­
imise the collective group capital invested in the project) whilst concurrently 
ensuring tha t the borrower exerts high effort. There is the obvious tension 
between lender’s maximising his objective function and giving the group a 
sufficient collective stake in the project so that the borrower exerts high 
effort. The lender’s problem is
max (j> =  irhr( 1 — ws — Wb)
subject to the lender’s zero profit condition, the saver’s and the borrower’s 
participation and incentive compatibility constraints. By substituting bind­
ing the constraints, i.e. (S-PC), (S-ICC), (B-ICC) and (L-ZPC), into the 
lender’s objective function, the lender’s problem can be written as
min Wb (R , c, w s (R,c)) + w s (R ,c)
R,c
The lender’s problem is solved in Appendix 3.8. The following set of propo­
sitions summarise the results that follow.
L em m a 3. For projects x  ^  the lender induces the saver to monitor 
with intensity c* by setting R  = R* where R* = -fr, B'(c*) = —1.
The proof is given in Appendix 3.8.
The saver gets a contract (R*,wl) where
The borrower gets a contract (r, u>l) where
From the Figure 3.3 and the discussion in the preceding section, it should 
be clear that with this contract, the borrower would get a positive rent and 
the saver no rent. We show this in Appendix 3.8.3.
L em m a 4. Group lending is only feasible i f  p > p where
For p ^  p, the wealth threshold to be a borrower is less than the wealth 
threshold to be a saver, w*s ^  wj. In Appendix 3.8.3, we show that the bor­
rower gets all the rent and saver gets no rent from the above given contract.
a borrower and no agent would choose to be a saver in the group. Conse­
quently, groups would not be formed and the lender would have to revert to 
individual lending.
Group lending only works if p > p. In this range, the wealth threshhold 
for borrowers is always greater than the wealth threshold for savers, that is 
w*s < Wealth is able to sort agents in their roles as borrower and saver. 
Agents with wealth in the range [w*,wl) have choice but becomes savers in 
the group. Agents with wealth in the range [iuj[, 1) are eligible to be both 
borrower and saver in the group. They choose to be borrowers in the group 
as only in this role they can retain rents.
P ro p o sitio n  8. The minimum collective group wealth required to borrow in 
group lending is lower than in individual lending.
It follows tha t all agents with wealth in the range [u;J, 1) would choose to be
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The minimum wealth required to borrow in individual lending and group 
lending is given by (3.4) and (3.6) respectively. Given that B (0) ^  B(c*)+c*, 
w[ ^  wl always hold.
3.4.5 Group Formation
P ro p o sitio n  9 (Negative Assortative Matching). I f  p > p, an agent with 
enough wealth to be a borrower will always prefer to pair up with an agent 
who has enough wealth to be a saver but not enough to be a borrower and vice 
versa.
Let’s assume that agents k\ and k<i have enough cash wealth to be bor­
rowers, that is Wk1,u)iC2 £ [wj, 1). Agents n\ and 722 have cash wealth to be 
savers but not borrower, that is wni,w n2 G [w*,wl).
For agent fci, paring up with agent n\ (and similarly agent nf) will ensure 
that she would be able to borrow in the group. Agent Aq’s expected payoff 
from this pairing is
p{wkl - w l )  + E[bi I H] (3.7)
For agent k \ , pairing up with agent k2 would imply that she would have 
to compete with agent &2 to become the borrower in the group. We assume 
that if agents in the group compete for the role of the borrower, the role is 
allocated randomly to an agent. The other agent has to take on the role of 
the saver. Agent k i s  expected payoff from pairing with agent k2 is given by
i  [p(wkl -  w l )  + E[bi | 77]] +  i  [p(wkl -  w*s ) + £ [s f | H] -  c*] (3.8)
Comparing (3.7) with (3.8), agent ki would prefer to pair up with agent
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n\ over agent &2 if the following condition holds
The condition always holds for projects x  G [^pi?, oo). Similarly, agent n\ 
would prefer to pair up with an agent k\ (and similarly agent k^) over agent 
n2 if the following condition holds.
p(wni -w*a) + E[si | H ]-c * pWn2 (3.9)
Agent n i ’s final payoff from pairing up with agent k\ is given by the LHS. 
Her payoff from pairing with agent ri2 is given by the RHS. Given that (3.9) 
holds with an equality, agent Tii is indifferent between the two choices.
3.5 Interest Rate Policy
In this section we examine the role of the interest rate policy. We analyse 
the cost and benefits of influencing the cost of capital in terms of its effect 
on outreach, i. e. its ability to reach the poorest.
The government intervenes in this market by either augmenting or de­
creasing the supply of loanable funds.3 This lowers the cost of capital or 
decrease p in the particular market. We assume that the policymaker’s abil­
ity to influence p is limited. She can influence p by a small amount, 8 in 
either direction.
3Given the competition amongst the lenders, if a particular lender gets his funds at 
a subsidised cost, he would just end up retaining the subsidy in the form of rents for 
himself. He would have no incentive to pass on the benefits of the subsidy to the agents 
participating in the group.
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Minimum cash wealth required to access the services offered by the mi­
crofinance institution is w*s(p) if p < p. If p ^  p, the minimum cash wealth 
required is w[(p).
3.5.1 Subsidising the Cost Of Capital
We examine the effect of subsidising the cost capital on the wealth required 
to participate in the group as a saver and as a borrower.
P ro p o sitio n  10. Subsidising the cost of capital decreases the wealth required 
to participate in the group as a borrower. Conversely, it increases the wealth 
required to participate in the group as a saver.
Differentiating w* and wl with respect to p allows us to examine the effect 
of subsidising the cost of capital on the group lending contract.
dw*s
dp
dwj
dp
7r c 
A7T p2_
< 0
7T
X  —
B(<r)
A tt 7T
> 0
Thus, decreasing p or subsidising the cost of capital decreases iyj, which in 
turns allows poorer agents to become borrowers in the group. Conversely, de­
creasing p increases w*. This implies that the minimum cash wealth required 
to participate in the group as a saver has increased. Overall, (wl +  wj), the 
collective group wealth required increases with p.
d « + Q  = 7r| 
dp p5 X  —
B{<?)
A7T
cw
A7T > 0
With increasing p, the policymaker gets a greater depth of outreach. At 
the same time, some agents who could have borrowed at the lower p are not 
be able to borrow now and are relegated to the role of a saver.
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There exists a p such that for all p £ ( p, p] the savers are able to 
accumulate enough wealth to able to borrow i n the next period, i f  the current 
project succeeds.
If the current projects succeeds, the savers of this period can accumulate 
enough cash wealth to borrow in the next period if the following condition 
is met.
w*R* > w l (3.10)
This holds for values of p tha t satisfy the following constraint
L em m a
x - * £ l - 4Air it^
1 — —Air
= P
p is the optimal p for allowing the poorest agents to escape the poverty trap. 
It maximises depth of outreach subject to the constraint (3.10).
W ith p = p, the poorest agents with sufficient wealth to be savers in this 
period can hope to become borrowers with probability irh in the next period. 
This would s tart a process by which a proportion n h of all savers in this 
period would become borrowers in the next period and pair up with agents 
aspiring to be savers. This process would be particularly helpful if wealth 
distribution is skewed and the relatively wealthy agents with cash wealth 
Wk ^  wl are in short supply.
As p increases, depth of outreach increases. Conversely, the gap between 
w*s and wl also increases with p making it more difficult for the poorest in 
the group to bridge the gap. We summarise with a proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  11. A t the optimal cost of capital p, the group lending pro-
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Figure 3.4: Reaching the Poor with the Interest Rate Policy
gramme can concurrently reach the poorest agents and, with probability n h, 
enrich them sufficiently at the end of the period so that they borrow next 
period.
If p in the market is greater than p, then subsidy is warranted. Conversely, 
if p in the market is less than p, curtailing the supply of loanable funds and 
driving up the cost of capital towards p would increase the outreach.
3.6 C onclusion
We analysed the use of wealth to engender peer monitoring when lending 
to the poor. All the agents have some cash wealth and no collateralizable 
assets. The lender encourages the poor individuals to form groups of two. 
He restricts the credit to each group, allowing only one member from each 
group to borrow. The group decides which group member gets the credit.
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The lender requires that the borrower in the group partly self-finances her 
project with her own cash wealth. This helps the lender align the borrower’s 
incentives with his own. The lender can further reduce the cost of aligning 
the borrower’s incentives with his own by inducing peer monitoring. He 
does that by requiring that the non-borrower member of the group makes 
an equity investment in the borrower’s project. The equity investment gives 
the non-borrower the incentive to influence the borrower’s effort decision by 
monitoring the borrower. She receives a higher than market return on her 
equity investment to compensate her for the cost of monitoring. Thus, the 
non-borrower member is in effect a saver in the group.
The lender offers the group a contract where he specifies the stake the 
borrower and the saver are required to have in the project along with their 
respective payoffs. We found that the borrower’s wealth threshold is set 
higher by the lender than the saver’s wealth threshold.
By restricting the credit to a group, the lender can induce the individuals 
to group across wealth levels. With intra-group competition for the loan, 
the individuals wealthy enough to be borrowers would choose to group with 
individuals who are wealthy enough to be savers but not wealthy enough to 
be borrowers. This is because it would ensure that the poor individuals do 
not compete for loans in the group.
We showed that if the cost of capital is subsidised or lowered, the bor­
rower’s wealth threshold decreases with it and the saver’s wealth threshold 
increases with it. The borrower’s interest burden decreases with the cost of 
capital. The lender can thus reduce the stake that the borrower is required 
to have in her project. Conversely, the saver’s premium on the equity invest­
ment decreases with the cost of capital. To compensate the saver for the cost 
of monitoring, the lender has to increase the saver’s stake in the project.
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Thus, subsidy actually limits the ability of the SHG mechanism to reach 
the poorest. On the other hand, subsidy also closes the gap between the 
wealth required to be a saver and the wealth required to be a borrower. 
Closing the gap is helpful in letting the current savers become borrowers in 
the near future. That is, the time a saver can expect to take to accumulate 
enough wealth to be a borrower decreases with the cost of capital.
We found that there was an optimal cost of capital, at which, the wealth 
required to be a saver was minimised subject to the constraint that the 
savers could transform themselves into borrowers in one period with a definite 
probability. Thus, if the policymakers have an ability to influence the cost 
of capital, they should try to push the cost of capital towards this optimal 
rate.
Subsidy only helps the poorest if the cost of capital is above this rate. 
Conversely, if the cost of capital is below the optimal rate, subsidy would 
harm the interest of the poorest by excluding them from the group lending 
mechanism.
Appendix
3.7 Group Lending: Saver’s Contract
The saver’s participation constraint and the incentive compatibility con­
straint can be written as
(S-PC) 
(S-ICC)
, _ V c ws { R - r ) ^  —r  
7Tn
R w s > - ^ -
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The borrower’s participation constraint can be written as
x  — r ^  (R  — r )w s (B-PC)
The three curves (S-PC), (S-ICC) and (B-PC) give us the area ABCD in 
Figure 3.3. A saver’s contract in the area ABCD would satisfy the three con­
straints given above. It may be noted that the area ABCD starts contracting 
if either c or p increases or x  decreases.
3.7.1 M axim um  Feasible M onitoring
For the area ABCD to exist, we need to ensure that (B-PC) is not to the left 
of (S-PC). It translates into the following condition.
Q
( x - r )  ^  ws ( R - r )  ^  —r
7T
The borrower’s participation constraint gives us the first inequality and the 
saver’s participation constraint gives us the second inequality from the left. 
From this we get an upper bound on the monitoring intensity c.
L em m a 6. The maximum monitoring that can be induced for a project is 
given by the following inequality.
c ^  7rh(x — r)
3.7.2 Existence of R
For the sake of completeness, we look at conditions under which R  exists. R  
is defined by the intersection of the (B-PC) and (S-ICC). But they do not
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necessarily intersect. If they intersect, it just means that the borrower’s rent 
can be driven down to zero.
R = { 1 -
i
(x—r)~Atr .
if c > A7r(x — r), 
if c ^  A tt(x — r).
(3.11)
(3.11) implies that R  exists only for a low-productivity high-monitoring 
combination. Given a project’s productivity £, a monitoring intensity c < 
A tt{x — r) can be induced without driving the borrower’s rent to zero. For 
higher monitoring intensity c ^  Air(x — r), the maximum return the saver 
can be given on her capital is given by R.
To summarise, the set of all the saver’s contracts (R ,w s) that satisfy 
(S-PC),(S-ICC) and (B-PC) are given by
in* ^  max
_7th(R — r) ’ A n R
VR  G (^r, i?] if c G ^A7r(x — r ) , n h(x — r) 
V # g ( ^ t , o o )  if c G ^0,  A tt(x -  r)
where R  is given by (3.11).
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3.8 Group Lending: Lender’s problem
Proof for Proposition 3. The lender’s problem is
max n hr ( l  — (ws +  Wb)^ j
subject to 7rh [x — r( 1 — ws — Wb) — Rws\ ^  pWb
7Th[x — r ( l  — ws — Wb) — Rws] ^
7t1[x — r( 1 — ws — Wb)—Rws] +  B(c)
7T hRws — C ^  pws
7ThRws — C ^  7TlRw 3 
pr =
7T
(B-PC)
(B-ICC)
(S-PC)
(S-ICC)
(L-ZPC)
Using (L-ZPC) and Lemma 6, we can summarise (S-PC), (S-ICC), (B- 
PC) with4
Wo >  max
(7xhR  — p) ’ A n R
V C ^  T T ^ ^ X  —)
7T
(3-12)
Using (L-ZPC), the (B-ICC) can be written as
wb ^  1 -
(#)
x  — B{c)
A tt + (# )
w. (3.13)
By substituting (3.12) and (3.13), the lender’s objective function can be 
written as a function of R  and c.
4There are two relevant ranges for R. The (S-PC) binds and (S-ICC) is slack if R  G 
(^r, -§t)- The (S-ICC) binds and (S-PC) is slack if R  > At R  =  both constraints 
bind. The (B-PC) is satisfied if c ^  n h(x —
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4> = 7rhr 1 -  {wb(R,c,wa(R,cj)  +  ws(R, c)}
\  A n n
=
h _  £_ 
R
n hx — n h ( B (c) +  c '
A n
(3.14)
For R  e  (^r,  £ ] ,  we find that
d(f) n hpc
dR  (nhR  — p)4
> 0  V c > 0
d(f)
dc V  1A7T Trh —  —
R
> 0 if B'(c) < —
^  0 if B'(c) ^
d<j)2 
dc2 
dcp2 
dc dR
^ ( » m <  o
=  — 7T
A7T 
n^R  — p
< 0
For i? ^  we find that
100
The optimal c as a function of R  is given by the following function
B \c )  =  max
nh — 7Tl
%h~ R
, - 1 (3.15)
C
monitor s 
monitoring costs
c
B(c)+c
B(0)
B (c)
borrower s 
private benefits
B(c)
45/ \
Consequently, the lender’s objective function, <^> =  ithr [l — (ws + Wb) ], 
is maximised if the following set of conditions are met.
R >
7r
V x e [  , oo) where B'(c*) = — 1
R =  P Alr V x € ( ^  ) where c =  7rhx -  p (3.16)
B'(c)
3.8.1 The Optimal Contract
For projects with x  E [ ^ f - , oo), the lender induces monitoring c* by setting 
R  = R* = The saver would be offered a contract (R* ,w s*) and the 
borrower would be offered a contract ( r , Wb*) where
R* = 7T
r =
1 _£l
.R* A7T 
P
7T
W b* =  1 -
(#)
R(c*)
A7T 7T
(3.17)
3.8.2 Low Productivity Projects
For projects with i  G ( ^ ,  9-^ E ) the lender induces monitoring c < c* by 
setting R  =  R  < R* where is c = 7rh(x — r). (See Section 3.7.1) Thus, the 
saver would be offered a contract ( R ,w s ) and the borrower would be offered
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a contract ( r  ,w b) where
R  =
7T +
A7T
m z )
1 cw, = —
(3.18)
r  =
7T
W b =  1 -
(^)
5(c) c
A7T 7Th 5 7(c)_
For projects i e ( ^ ,  ), the lender is not able to induce monitoring
intensity c*. This is because the saver’s contract (R*, w*), which is required to 
induce the saver to monitor with intensity c* would not satisfy the borrower’s 
participation contract.
Let’s suppose that for a project xG  ( )  the lender tries to induce 
the saver to monitor with intensity c* by offering her a contract (R* ,w s*). 
The contract would satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint if
s _ P > { R - _ P ) W3'
7r 7T
c* + p
7T
Thus contradicting the initial assumption about the project.
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3.8.3 Economic Rents
Economic rents obtained by the borrower in group lending are given by
E[bi | H] — pwb =  7vh [x — r( 1 — ws — wb) — Rws] — pwb
(3.19)
=  7rh [x — r — (R — r)ws]
Economic rents obtained by the saver in group lending are given by
E[si | H] — pws — c = 7rhRws — c — pw3
=  0 V . R € ( £ , £ ]
> 0
(3.20)
Using (3.19) and (3.20), the total rents obtained by the saver and the 
borrower are given by
E[bi | H] -  pwb +  £[si | H] -  pws -  c
7Th[x — r — (R — r)w3] V R  e  (^r,
7rh(x — r) — c
For the optimal contract (r,w l) and (R,w*) given by (3.17) in the previous 
section, the rents are given by
E[bi | H] — pwl = 7rh(x — r) — c*
E[si | H] — pwl -  c* — 0
For the optimal contract (r, wb) and (R , ws) given by (3.18) in the previous
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section, the rents are given by
E[bi | H] — pWb =  7rh(x — r) — c 
E[si | H] — pws — c — 0
The borrower gets all the rent and the saver gets zero rent with the 
optimal contract.
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Conclusion
We analysed the mechanisms by which a lender can engender peer monitoring 
when lending to a group of individuals who are jointly liable for each other’s 
project outcomes.
When lending to a group of wealth less individuals, where all borrow­
ers obtain their loans simultaneously, the lender has to allocate the group 
members rents that satisfy their collective incentive compatibility condition. 
Alternatively, the lender can lend sequentially within group with the proviso 
that second borrower’s loan is contingent on the first borrower successfully 
repaying the loan. Lending sequentially allows the lender to incentivise the 
borrowers’ tasks individually and not collectively, allowing him to leave the 
group’s collective incentive compatibility condition slack. Consequently, by 
lending sequentially, the lender is able to reduce the borrower’s rents and 
thus increase the lending efficiency.
In sequential lending, the lender punishes the whole group if the first 
borrower’s project fails, thus reducing his capital’s productivity. We were 
able to show that for a sufficiently efficient monitoring technology, the lender 
is able to finance a greater range of projects under sequential as compared 
to simultaneous group lending.
Using a case study approach, we examined the group lending mechanism 
used by a particular Microfinance Institution (Mfl) working in Haryana, In­
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dia. We found evidence of the Mfl lending sequentially to the group members, 
i. e. restricting the numbers of members that can borrow simultaneously at 
a given point in time. Further, restricting the number of members that can 
borrow simultaneously is useful in partitioning the group between borrowers 
and non-borrowers. By allowing the members to borrow internally, i. e. from 
the group’s accumulated savings, the Mfl effectively makes the non-borrowers 
equity investors in the borrowers’ investment projects. This gives the non­
borrowers an explicit incentive to monitor the borrowers. The case study 
found that there was significant income heterogeneity within the groups and 
the wealthier members of the group obtained a high proportion of the loans 
given to the group. Further, one in three members in each group had not 
even borrowed once, even though the other members had borrowed more 
than once.
We built a stylised model based on the case study, in which the lender 
lends to individuals (in a group) with varying amount of cash wealth at 
their disposal. We showed that the lender can engender negative assortative 
matching, i. e. relatively wealthy individuals grouping with poorer individ­
uals, by restricting the credit to the group. The lender allows only one 
borrower in a two member group to borrow and specifies the stakes the bor­
rower and the non-borrower are required to have in the borrower’s project. 
In doing so, the lender decides on the borrower’s and non-borrower’s wealth 
thresholds for joining the group.
Restricting credit to the group creates intra-group competition for loans 
in the group. Thus, the wealthy eliminate the competition within the group 
by grouping with poorer individuals whose wealth is below the borrower’s 
threshold. Consequently, not allowing the group members to borrow simul­
taneously allows the lender to lower the wealth threshold for participating in
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the group.
Further, we were able to show that as cost of capital is lowered, the non­
borrower’s threshold increases and the borrower’s threshold decreases, thus 
closing the gap between the two thresholds. We define the optimal cost of 
capital, in this case, as the one which allows the poorest borrower to join the 
group as a non-borrower and graduate on to becoming a borrower within one 
loan cycle. Thus, the subsidising the cost of capital is only warranted if the 
market cost of capital is above the optimal cost of capital.
The essays have allowed us to examine the significance of timing of the 
loans in group lending. Determining the sequence of the loans to a group has 
the potential of improving the efficiency of lending to groups. We were also 
able to find evidence of a Microfinance Institution in India sequencing loans 
to its groups.
We were able to show theoretically that when lending to a group of in­
dividuals with no wealth, the lender can finance a greater range of projects 
if he lends sequentially. Similarly, when lending to a group of individuals 
with varying amounts of cash wealth, by restricting credit to the group, the 
lender can provide incentives for the relatively wealthy to group with the 
poorer individuals and thus lower the wealth threshold for the joining the 
group.
108
Bibliography
Armendariz de Aghion, B. and Morduch, J. (2005). The Economics of Mi­
crofinance. MIT Press.
Banerjee, A. V., Besley, T., and Guinnane, T. W. (1994). Thy neighbor’s 
keeper: The design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2):491-515.
Besley, T. J. and Coate, S. (1995). Group lending, repayment incentives and 
social collateral. Journal of Development Economics, 46(1): 1—18.
Burgess, R. and Pande, R. (2004). Do rural banks matter? evidence from 
the indian social banking experiment. C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Chavan, P. and Ramakumar, R. (2005). Interest rates and micro-credit. In 
Ramachandran, V. K. and Swaminathan, M., editors, Financial Liberal­
ization and Rural Credit in India, pages 147-156. Tulika Books.
Conning, J. (1996). Group lending, moral hazard and the creation of social 
collateral. IR IS  Working paper, (165).
Conning, J. (2000). Monitoring by delegates or by peers? joint liability loans 
under moral hazard.
109
Gaiha, R. (2001). Micro-credit and the rural poor: A review of the maha- 
rashtra rural credit project. Journal of Microfinance.
Ghatak, M. (1999). Group lending, local information and peer selection. 
Journal of Development Economics, 60:27-50.
Ghatak, M. and Guinnane, T. W. (1999). The economics of lending with 
joint liability: theory and practice. Journal of Development Economics, 
60(l):195-228.
Harper, M. (1998). Why are commercial banks not entering the micro-finance 
market? h ttp ://www.microfinancegateway.org/.
Harper, M. (2002). Promotion of self help groups under the shg bank link­
age programme in india. Paper presented at the SHG-bank Linkage Pro­
gramme Seminar, New Delhi.
Hoff, K. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1990). Imperfect information and rural credit 
markets - puzzles and policy perspectives. World Bank Economic Review, 
4(3):235-50.
Laffont, J.-J. and Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The 
Principal-Agent Model Princeton University Press.
Laffont, J.-J. and Rey, P. (2003). Moral hazard, collusion and group lending.
Narasimhan, M. (1991). Report of the committee on the financial system. 
Technical report, Reserve Bank of India.
Puhazhendi, V. and Badatya, K. C. (2002). Shg-bank linkage programme 
for rural poor - an impact assessment. Paper presented at the SHG-bank 
Linkage Programme Seminar, New Delhi.
110
Puhazhendi, V. and Satyasai, K. (2000). Micro finance for rural people: An 
impact evaluation. Study Report (Mumbai: Nabard).
Roy Chowdhury, P. (2005). Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender mon­
itoring and joint liability. Journal of Development Economics, 77:415-439.
Stiglitz, J. (1990). Peer monitoring and credit markets. World Bank Eco­
nomic Review, 4(3):351-366.
Varian, H. (1990). Monitoring agents with other agents. Journal of Institu­
tional and Theoretical Economics, 146(1): 153-174.
Ill
